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Abstract: This thesis explores current United States policies prohibiting public funding for 
nonreproductive cloning, logically reconstructs their justification, and argues against it. I show 
that a common conceptual framework underlies the national prohibition on the use of public 
funds for cloning research, which I call the simple argument.  This argument rests on two 
premises: that research harming human embryos is unethical and that embryos produced via 
fertilization are identical to those produced via cloning.  In response to the simple argument, I 
challenge the latter premise.  I demonstrate there are important ontological differences between 
human embryos (produced via fertilization) and clone embryos (produced via cloning). After 
considering the implications my argument has for the morality of publicly funding cloning for 
potential therapeutic purposes and potential responses to my position, I conclude that such 
funding is not only ethically permissible, but also humane national policy. 
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PREFACE 
The following work was inspired by a term paper for the first history course I took in graduate 
school, History of Science II, with Paolo Palmieri, in the Department of History and Philosophy 
of Science. Years later, after completing the coursework requirements for the M. A. in Bioethics, 
I faced a need for a thesis topic. I had already been inspired by my coursework in bioethics to 
focus my PhD dissertation in the HPS department on topics in philosophy of medicine and 
medical ethics. So it was only natural that I chose to take a topic from HPS and work it out in 
detail for my M. A. in Bioethics. Yes, only natural; such is the nature of my interdisciplinary 
approach to scholarship. I thank Paolo for providing me an opportunity to think about 
contemporary history of science funding policies and for supporting my inquiry into what did not 
appear particularly consistent with other scholarship I was becoming familiar with at the time. 
Many others warrant thanks and recognition. My wife, Stephanie, has steadfastly 
supported my pursuit of wisdom and degrees. I hope they go hand in hand. And I hope that one 
day I learn how to write as well as she can so that I may share what I have learned articulately. 
Also, I have made many friends while pursuing my education in Pittsburgh. Some of them have 
influenced my thinking on this project in particular, including James Tabery, Yoichi Ishida, Peter 
Distelzweig, Jason Byron, and Peter Gildenhuys. Another friend, Kathryn Tabb, specifically 
helped me frame my discussion in § 2.1. She often helps me see forests where I see trees and 
trees where I see forests. I think she would agree the world is just composed of elephants. 
During a conference at Arizona State University, Jane Maienschein challenged my 
thinking in this project. My response to her criticism helped clarify the thesis of the project and 
also anticipate one way it could be misconstrued. It is to her that I owe the objection described in 
§ 4.1, although in my recollection she delivered it more clearly and persuasively than I render it.  
Locally, I have been helped enormously by Lisa Parker. As a teacher, she introduced me 
to important material in bioethics and frequently challenged my intuitions. And as the Director of 
the M. A. Program in Bioethics, she strategized with me about how to complete the degree in a 
way that was most consistent with my own interests and the standards of the program. Moreover, 
she did this for over five years with consistent and utmost patience. Likewise, both Mark 
Wicclair and Douglas White have helped me mature as a scholar and work through this project in 
particular. During my prospectus defense they articulated an objection to my position that is now 
conveyed and responded to in § 4.2. I also profited in many ways from taking Theoretical 
Foundations of Bioethics with Mark, where I learned that my training in philosophy of science, 
 ix 
such as it was, did not prepare me sufficiently well to do good work in philosophical ethics, 
applied or otherwise. Insofar as I have learned that skill, it is directly correlated with the extent to 
which I have attended to the example he sets and to his specific criticisms of my work. 
A number of institutions have directly or indirectly financially supported the completion 
of this project. Thanks go first and foremost to the HPS Department at the University of 
Pittsburgh, my generous academic home from 2005 to 2013. The Center for Bioethics and Health 
Law, also at Pitt, supported my attendance at the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities 
in 2010, where I enjoyed discussions about this project that helped move it along. Portions of the 
project were presented at the University of Pittsburgh Graduate Student Expo 2007, the History 
and Philosophy of Biology in the Desert Conference at ASU in 2011, and at the 2011 meeting of 
the International Society for the History, Philosophy, and Social Studies of Biology (ISHPSSB). 
I thank both ASU and ISHPSSB for their support. Currently I am employed at the University of 
Arkansas for Medical Sciences. I thank D. Micah Hester for supporting my completion of this 
project while transitioning to my current position. 
Portions of this work have recently been published. I sincerely thank an anonymous 
reviewer (or a set of reviewers, one cannot be sure) for thorough, clear, and yet generally 
supportive criticisms of key parts of it. Without his or her (or their) effort(s), I would not have 
appreciated the relevance of my work to arguments concerning induced pluripotent stem cells 
(iPSCs). Much of this thesis appears in revised form in Cunningham (2013b), where specific 
acknowledgements to this anonymous reviewer (and others) may be found. While responding to 
her objections, I was motivated to learn more about iPSCs. Thus, when Mark Wicclair suggested 
I submit a proposal to an AJOB Open Peer commentary, I was ready with something to say. 
Thanks go to Mark for the suggestion, and to the reviewer for the motivation. The resulting essay 
is published as Cunningham (2013a) and forms the basis for § 3.3 of this thesis. Thanks to both 
Springer and Taylor Francis, which have given me permission to reuse the previously published 
work in this document. 
Finally, if you are reading this, thank you for the time and effort. Enjoy. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
The nucleus of a somatic cell can be transferred to an enucleated egg cell, or oocyte, resulting in 
a unicellular product that can be activated by electrical stimulation to undergo some of the 
developmental processes typical of a human embryo. This process is called somatic cell nuclear 
transfer (SCNT).  After a few days of subsequent development, under laboratory conditions the 
resulting cellular material can be used to derive stem cells matching the genetic profile of the 
initial somatic cell (Tachibana et al. 2013).1 Stem cells produced in this fashion could be used to 
derive tissue that matched donor tissue well enough to circumvent the immunological responses 
that serve as major barriers to successful transplant and regenerative medicine (Hochedlinger and 
Jaenisch 2003).  The products of SCNT might also be used for reproduction – to create human 
beings whose genomes would be nearly identical to the genomes of the donated somatic cells 
from which they originate.2 
                                                
1 This research was funded via institutional funds from the Oregon Health Sciences University and funds 
from the Leducq Foundation, not from US public funding.  
2 In theory, a human reproduced by cloning would at most have only nearly identical DNA to the nucleus 
from which it originated because his or her mitochondrial DNA would come from the oocyte used in 
SCNT, rather than the somatic cell.  Additionally, polar bodies and epigenetic mechanisms of inheritance 
would also influence what genes are expressed as that person develops, creating another source of genetic 
diversity. 
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Like all stem cell research, SCNT is controversial because it appears to deliberately 
create and destroy entities of the utmost moral concern, human embryos. But SCNT is also 
controversial because of its theoretical potential to be used for the cloning of human beings.  For 
these reasons, United States federal funds are prohibited from supporting research employing 
SCNT, even though it is a biotechnology touted for having great potential to treat myriad human 
diseases, such as Parkinson’s disease, diabetes, and congestive heart failure (Lanzendorf, Boyd, 
and Wright 2004).3  It seems a choice must be made between protecting the sanctity of life at the 
expense of potentially lessening suffering or striving to lessen suffering at the expense of 
crossing a bright moral line prohibiting the killing of innocent human beings (embryos).  The 
purpose of this thesis is to challenge this apparent dilemma by questioning the justification for 
the current ban on federal funding of SCNT for research purposes, also known as 
nonreproductive cloning. My thesis is that the justification for the ban rests on the false 
assumption that the product of SCNT is a human embryo or an entity deserving of the moral 
status of a human embryo.  If one rejects this claim, as I do, then this challenging dilemma 
dissolves. I conclude that the funding of biomedical research employing SCNT aids the fight 
against human suffering without allowing the destruction or desecration of human life. If my 
                                                
3 The therapeutic potential of stem cell research (SCR) is extremely controversial and uncertain, and will 
remain so for the near future.  Currently, it is only a theoretical potential, as few randomized controlled 
trials are underway for stem cell therapies, which would show its actual feasibility.  Notably, a 
biotechnology leader in stem cell research has recently ceased all efforts in the field (Pollack 2011); 
however, recent preliminary results from another leading company suggest that some patients benefit 
from therapies derived from SCR (Schwartz et al. 2012).  While currently stem cell therapies are 
unfortunately primarily the province of speculation and unethical treatment (see Enserink 2006), it is 
possible that with funding, federal oversight, and national and global regulation, ethical therapies could be 
developed that will benefit many suffering individuals. 
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argument is sound, then even those who believe that human life begins at conception, rather than 
at a later stage in human development, can endorse SCNT without choosing to protect some 
human beings at the expense of others. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I trace the historical origins of the ban on the federal 
funding of SCNT in section 1 and demonstrate in section 2 that the ban was originally justified 
on the grounds of what I will call the simple argument: that funding SCNT is tantamount to 
funding research that harms human embryos.  In chapter 2, I advance the core argument of this 
work, namely that the simple argument is unsound because it rests on a false premise stipulating 
an identity relationship between human embryos and the products of SCNT.   The remainder of 
the thesis anticipates and responds to objections to this criticism of the simple argument.  One 
might respond that, irrespective of the soundness of my position, the product of SCNT deserves 
the same moral status as a human embryo and hence it also deserves our protection – including a 
ban on such research.  Or, one might argue for an alternative approach to justifying the 
prohibition, by appealing to the political realities of policymaking.  I consider and counter these 
objections in Chapters Three and Four, respectively. Chapter Five concludes briefly by restating 
the argument for my view that the current prohibition on funding is unjustified.  If my argument 
stands, a different justification for the ban on federally funding SCNT is required; otherwise, the 
potential for relieving suffering provides a sufficient justification for aggressively funding 
research employing SCNT using public funds. 
1.1 A Ban on Federal Funding of Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer 
For decades, philosophers, politicians, and policymakers have debated the merits and ethics of 
scientific research upon human embryos.  Historically, these debates have been tightly linked to 
 4 
deliberations over reproductive rights, where participants frequently invoke positions on abortion 
and artificial reproductive technologies (Henig 2004).  More recently, these debates have also 
focused on a new issue, human cloning, which has culminated in the current ban on federal 
funding of SCNT.  In this sub-section I describe how these political debates have led to the ban, 
demonstrating that a common view pervades policymaking on cloning and embryo research, that 
it is unethical because it involves the destruction of human embryos. 
From 1975 to 1993, federal law permitted using public funds for research on in vitro 
fertilization (IVF), provided it was first approved by an Ethics Advisory Board (EAB).  
However, political constraints entailed that no such funding was ever available: by failing to 
charter an EAB during their administrations, the Regan and (first) Bush administrations 
circumvented the only lawful mechanism for approving federal funding for IVF research 
(Fletcher 1995).  In 1993, the Clinton administration repealed a federal moratorium on fetal 
tissue research.  This signaled that administration’s commitment to liberalizing federal 
regulations of scientific research set in place by the prior two administrations.  Shortly thereafter, 
Congress repealed the EAB requirement for federal IVF funding and the National Institute of 
Health (NIH) created the Human Embryo Research Panel (HERP) to provide guidance on other 
types of research employing human embryos.  
In 1994, HERP issued its report on embryo research.  It distinguished three categories of 
embryonic research, one being research that was prima facie unacceptable, and hence for which 
funding was prohibited; another being research that was prima facie acceptable, and hence for 
which funding was permitted; and another for research whose acceptability was unclear, which 
would require further examination before funding decisions could be made.  Notably, research 
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on parthenogenesis and somatic cell nuclear transfer both fell into the second category, of 
acceptable research (Riley and Merrill 2005, pp. 22-26).4 
The HERP recommendations never became federal policy or found their way into 
legislation.  Indeed, HERP received a considerably negative reaction because of its inclusion of 
embryos created expressly for research in its third category.  Such research seemed patently 
impermissible to many Congressional conservatives, prompting them to rail against the HERP 
guidelines.  After strong conservative gains in the elections of November 1994, the fate of the 
HERP report was sealed; on the day it was announced, President Clinton issued a statement 
barring funding for research that created embryos solely for research purposes (ibid., p. 26). 
The idea that scientists might begin creating embryos and destroying them for research 
purposes was anathema to many in Washington.  Two Congressmen in particular, Jay Dickey 
and Roger Wicker, added what has become known as the Dickey-Wicker Amendment to what 
would become the Balanced Budget Down-Payment Act (Maienschein 2003, p. 3). The 
amendment reads, in full: 
None of the funds made available by Public Law 104–91 may be used for—(1) the 
creation of a human embryo or embryos for research purposes; or (2) research in which a 
human embryo or embryos are destroyed, discarded, or knowingly subjected to risk of 
injury or death greater than that allowed for research on fetuses in utero under 45 CFR 
46.208(a)(2) and 42 U.S.C. 289g(b). For purposes of this section, the phrase ‘‘human 
embryo or embryos’’ shall include any organism, not protected as a human subject under 
                                                
4 The history of politics, philosophy, and embryo research policy during this era is fascinating and worthy 
of considerations, but beyond the scope of the present discussion.  See Riley and Merrill (2005) and 
Green (2001) for detailed discussions. 
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45 CFR 46 as of the date of enactment of this Act, that is derived by fertilization, 
parthenogenesis, cloning, or any other means from one or more human gametes (Public 
Law 104-99 1996). 
While this amendment clearly prohibits funding the creation of human embryos for research 
purposes, it is unclear whether it precludes funding research on entities whose status as human 
embryos is uncertain.  
Consider, for example, cells derived from embryos.  Seeking to comply with federal law, 
in 1998, the NIH requested that Harriet Rabb, the general counsel of the Department of Health 
and Human Services (DHHS), give legal counsel regarding whether the amendment permitted 
funding human embryonic stem cell research.  Her response (known as the Rabb Doctrine) was 
that the Dickey-Wicker amendment “would not apply to research utilizing human pluripotent 
stem cells because such cells are not a human embryo within the statutory definition” (Rabb 
1999).  The Rabb Doctrine initially paved the way for federal funding of stem cell research 
utilizing cell lines that were derived from human embryos; however, it never permitted funding 
research on the derivation of those cell lines, which requires the destruction of embryos.  
Moreover, whatever clarity the doctrine initially provided was soon altered by the statements of 
President George W. Bush.5  
A year before Rabb’s work, scientists announced the cloning of a sheep named Dolly 
(Wilmut et al. 1997).  This announcement animated members of the United States House of 
Representatives, who sought to pass the Human Cloning Prohibition Act in 2001.  Though it 
                                                
5 The Rabb Doctrine has survived several Federal court challenges and remains in effect today.  See 
Robertson (2010), Cohen and Adashi (2011), and Annas (2011) for recent discussions of the doctrine, this 
litigation, and its implications for federal funding of stem cell research.  The most recent decision 
affirming the Rabb Doctrine came on August, 24, 2012 (Sherley vs. Sebelius 2012). 
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passed the House, the Senate never took up the bill.  Yet, it is important because it shows that by 
2001, members of Congress had identified human cloning via SCNT as a target for their 
opprobrium.  Perhaps because of the maneuvering of the NIH, the House sought to be explicit in 
its prohibition of cloning.  The bill prohibited any public or private person or entity from 
engaging in a number of activities related to human cloning, defined as:  
…human asexual reproduction, accomplished by introducing nuclear material from one 
or more human somatic cells into a fertilized or unfertilized oocyte whose nuclear 
material has been removed or inactivated so as to produce a living organism (at any stage 
of development) that is genetically virtually identical to an existing or previously existing 
human organism” (quoted in Maienschein 2003, pp. 288-289).   
Less than two weeks after the U.S. House passed the cloning prohibition act, President 
George W. Bush gave his first major televised address to the nation.  The President said he must 
decide “whether to allow federal funds, your tax dollars, to be used for scientific research on 
stem cells derived from human embryos.” For Bush, this was a moral issue: “research on 
embryonic stem cells raises profound ethical questions because extracting the stem cell destroys 
the embryo and thus destroys its potential for life” (White House 2001).  Bush decided to permit 
funding research on preexisting cell lines and to prohibit funding for any additional research 
involving the destruction of human embryos.  He said this approach allowed Americans “to 
explore the promise and potential of stem cell research without crossing a fundamental moral 
line by providing taxpayer funding that would sanction or encourage further destruction of 
human embryos that have at least the potential for life” (ibid.).   
With his speech, the President set the terms of debate over embryonic stem cell research.  
He also announced a Presidential Order superseding much of the Rabb Doctrine, including the 
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prohibition of federal funding of any research involving new stem cell lines, even after their 
derivation.  Finally, Bush also announced the creation of a President’s Council on Bioethics 
(PCBE), which was charged with proposing guidelines and regulations for biomedical research 
and, in particular, cloning and stem cell research.  
The result of the council’s inquiry was published in July of 2002.  It offered two distinct 
recommendations to the President and policymakers, with the majority of the council members 
(10/17) voting for “a congressionally enacted ban on all attempts at cloning-to-produce-children 
and a four-year national moratorium (a temporary ban) on human cloning-for-biomedical-
research” (President’s Council on Bioethics 2002a, p. 205), where, “cloning-for-biomedical-
research” is synonymous with nonreproductive cloning, or SCNT for the purpose of research 
(ibid., pp. 42-46).6  The PCBE emphasized that the moral issue at hand was whether the federal 
government should fund research designed to create and destroy human embryos, including 
research utilizing somatic cell nuclear transfer (ibid., p. 201). 
With the conclusion of its deliberations and the publication of its report, the President’s 
Council on Bioethics added yet another powerful voice to the chorus of opposition against 
federal funding of somatic cell nuclear transfer for the purpose of deriving cellular material for 
stem cell research.  By the middle of 2002, two of the three branches of federal government had 
spoken out against federal funding of SCNT, and President Bush had adopted the PCBE majority 
recommendation.   
With the election of President Barack Obama, advocates for stem cell research had high 
hopes that the new administration would change these policies.  On March 11, 2009, their hopes 
                                                
6 Consistent with the view argued for here, the minority recommended a total ban on reproductive cloning 
and federal regulation of nonreproductive cloning. 
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were partially met when President Obama issued an order revoking the Presidential Order of 
August 2001 (White House 2009).  For many this move was unsatisfying because it failed to lift 
the ban on federal funding of SCNT and parthenogenesis put in place by the Dickey-Wicker 
Amendment (Robertson 2010). 
1.2 A Simple Argument Against Federal Funding  
Since 1996, politicians and policymakers who argue against the morality of federally funding 
somatic cell nuclear transfer have favored one line of reasoning in particular.  It holds (i) that 
federal funds should not be used for scientific research that harms human embryos, and (ii) that 
SCNT is a member of this class of research methods.  The PCBE claimed that cloning via SCNT 
should be permanently opposed because “it is immoral to create human embryos for purposes 
that are foreign to the embryos’ own well-being and that necessarily require their destruction” 
(President’s Council on Bioethics 2002a, p. 201).  President Bush stated that the moral dilemma 
brought about by the prospect of funding stem cell research was precisely that such research 
required the destruction of human embryos. And, though it did not prohibit SCNT explicitly, the 
Dickey-Wicker amendment prohibited any technique that destroys or discards human embryos, 
specifically those derived by cloning.   
In each of these cases, a prohibition on federal funding for nonreproductive cloning is 
justified by the following argument: 
1. The federal government should be prohibited from funding unethical scientific research. 
2. Research that harms human embryos is unethical because human embryos have a moral 
status that makes them deserving of our respect and protection. 
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3. If somatic cell nuclear transfer creates and destroys human embryos then it harms human 
embryos. 
4. Somatic cell nuclear transfer creates and destroys human embryos. 
5. Somatic cell nuclear transfer harms human embryos. [3, 4] 
6. Somatic cell nuclear transfer is unethical because it harms human embryos. [2, 5]  
7. The government should be prohibited from funding research utilizing somatic cell 
nuclear transfer. [1, 6] 
For the purposes of this analysis, I will call this argument the Simple Argument From 
Identity or the simple argument.7 
The simple argument is simple because it rests on four claims, two of which are fairly 
uncontroversial (1, 3) and two of which are not (2, 4).  Thus, the soundness of the simple 
argument may be said to come down to the plausibility of just two claims. 
Although one might challenge Premise 1, here it will be treated as uncontroversial. 
Premise 3 also seems acceptable: whether creating something harms it or not, destroying 
something certainly harms it.  Out of the two contentious premises, it is common to attack 
Premise 2, which may be rejected on the grounds that human embryos lack a moral status and are 
not deserving of our respect and protection (e.g., DeGrazia 2002). 
In this analysis, however, the strategy will be different: I grant the truth of the first three 
premises as they stand for the sake of argument and instead target the fourth premise.  I will 
argue that somatic cell nuclear transfer does not create human embryos, and consequently it does 
                                                
7 One might add another premise to the argument defining what constitutes harm to embryos, such as: To 
harm a human embryo includes such acts as destroying, discarding, or knowingly subjecting it to certain 
levels of risk of injury or death, as defined by United States law.  For the sake of this analysis such a 
premise is assumed but suppressed. 
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not destroy human embryos.8  Rather, SCNT creates clone embryos, which are ontologically and 
morally distinct from human embryos. If clone embryos are not identical to human embryos, 
then it follows that the fourth premise is false, because SCNT thus does not create and destroy 
human embryos.   Therefore, the inference to the fifth premise fails and the rest of the argument 
fails to go through as well.   
My argument requires considering knowledge from cellular developmental biology in 
some detail, in order to show that clone embryos and human embryos are ontologically distinct. 
Some of this knowledge is based on cutting edge experiments in embryology and stem cell 
research, which has yet to be replicated and the biological implications of which are not yet well 
understood. My argument is thus highly sensitive to empirical knowledge and may be altered or 
even invalidated as this knowledge accrues over time. Although in one sense this is a weakness 
of the argument, it is also its strength: by demonstrating that a careful consideration of the 
science of cloning bears on the question of whether funding this activity is morally permissible, I 
provide a means of relating descriptive claims about the nature of different types of entities 
(embryos) to normative claims about the permissibility of research using and destroying them. It 
                                                
8 It is important, at this point, to clarify a potential ambiguity. As stated here, the simple argument may be 
ambiguous in terms of how it defines SCNT, in that it could simply mean the singular act of nuclear 
transfer and none of the steps in the process of cloning that come thereafter.  To define SCNT thusly 
would be to evade the reasons given for opposing it rather than to challenge them.  To prevent this 
interpretation, it should be made clear that by SCNT, I mean not only the act of nuclear transfer, but also 
the following, discussed in detail below (§ 2.3): the preparation of donor cells (removal of nuclei from 
somatic cell and oocyte), the combination of somatic nucleus and oocyte (nuclear transfer), the activation 
of the reconstituted oocyte, and the initial divisions of this cell to the clone blastocyst stage, all of which 
are performed ex vivo.  Thus, following a successful act of SCNT, clone embryonic stem cells could in 
theory be isolated from the inner cell mass of the clone blastocyst and used for the research of cell 
therapies for transplant and regenerative medicine, as in Tachibana et al. (2013).  
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may be the case that in the future our descriptive knowledge of embryology will change and that 
the similarities or dissimilarities between the developmental pathways of human and clone 
embryos consequently change. In the future, then, it may be the case that it no longer seems 
reasonable to hold that human and clone embryos are ontologically distinct. If so, then my view 
provides a means of understanding the moral implications of this change in perspective, should it 
arise. It would entail that the simple argument is valid, absent criticism of its other premises, and 
thus that prohibiting public funding of nonreproductive cloning research is morally permissible.   
My argument also considers the extent to which it is possible to support the simple 
argument by arguing that clone embryos warrant moral status on grounds that are independent 
from, though often analogous to, the grounds for holding that human embryos warrant attribution 
of moral status. If my argument is sound, then it is also significant because of this. It shows that 
one’s intuitions about the moral status of human embryos produced by fertilization (and their 
derivatives)9 should be independent from, and have little or no bearing on, one’s intuitions about 
the moral status of embryos produced by SCNT for the purposes of deriving cellular material for 
therapeutic research. 
However, showing this does not preclude the possibility that clone embryos warrant the 
attribution of moral status. To support the view that clone embryos do not warrant attribution of 
moral status requires demonstrating that apparently valid reasons for holding clone embryos 
should be attributed moral status are not as valid as they seem, and by showing that whether they 
are valid ought to be determined by considering the developmental potentials of clone embryos, 
qua clone embryos, not by considering the developmental potentials of human embryos and then 
                                                
9 This includes human embryonic stem cells, which will be discussed below, when we consider objections 
to the argument presented here. 
 13 
making an analogy to clone embryos. Thus, although my aim is to target Premise 4 of the simple 
argument, I anticipate that one response to my view will be to invoke an alternative version of 
Premise 2 where "human" is replaced with the word "clone" and the simple argument is altered 
accordingly, such that it now targets clone embryos rather than human embryos and now holds 
that clone embryos warrant moral status. In order to counter this move, I will also spend 
considerable effort discussing the extent to which clone embryos warrant moral status given 
traditional views on attributing status. So in this sense I will be concerned with Premise 2 as well 
as Premise 4, although only after Premise 2 is modified such that it targets clone embryos 
directly, rather than by analogy with or identity to human embryos. 
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2.0  A RESPONSE TO THE SIMPLE ARGUMENT 
To engage with the proponent of a ban on federal funding of SCNT, I have fairly explained the 
recent history of this policy and I have also reconstructed the argument justifying its institution 
given by philosophers, politicians, and policymakers. In this chapter, I demonstrate this 
reasoning is flawed because it is based on a premise that is false; consequently, proponents of 
prohibition ought to revise their argument or invoke an alternative.  
I begin, in section 2.1, by describing assumptions I make about reasonable argument in 
public policy deliberations. I do this because the opponent of public funding for SCNT might 
make different assumptions about how policies ought to be deliberated upon. Since this higher-
order commitment might lead her to find my arguments unpersuasive, because they might be 
beside the point, I begin by making these assumptions clear. If my interlocutor accepts them, 
then I contend we begin from a shared starting point. In section 2.2, I move from this shared 
starting point to describing a possible point of contention between my view and my opponent’s. I 
argue that we can describe the origins and early developmental stages of human embryos with 
some precision. If I am right, then I claim that human embryos are the products of fertilization, 
and this tells us something important about them. Similarly, I argue we can describe the origins 
and early developmental stages of the products of SCNT, which I suggest we call “clone 
embryos” for reasons given below (§ 2.3). If so, then I conclude this chapter by arguing that we 
can distinguish between human and clone embryos in terms of their origins, developmental 
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pathways, and thus, their developmental potentials. In section 2.4, I argue that these are 
ontological differences, and that these differences are important because they demonstrate that 
what many think is an innocuous premise in the simple argument (P4) is likely to be false. By 
arguing that clone embryos and human embryos are different entities, I challenge the identity 
claim upon which P4 rests. If my argument is sound, then the simple argument is invalid because 
it rests on a claim that evidence suggests is false. However, the proponent of the simple argument 
may offer a rejoinder by challenging my empirical premises, offering new empirical data, or 
putting forward objections on different grounds. I consider the latter possibility in subsequent 
chapters. 
2.1 An “Unreasonable” Prohibition  
My response to the simple argument relies on assumptions about the nature of policy 
justification, the contours of which warrant brief description.  To put it succinctly, I contend that 
justified public policies must be reasonable.  Thus, if a public policy is unreasonable, then it is 
unjustified; and, if a public policy is unjustified, then there is an imperative that it be revoked or 
refashioned such that it becomes reasonable.  I understand reasonableness to entail certain norms 
of public discourse, which, when followed, lead to justified policies.  I contend that if my 
interlocutor shares this commitment to reasonableness and the simple argument is shown to be 
unsound, then my interlocutor must reject that argument. In response, the proponent of 
prohibition must offer an alternative argument or agree to revise public policy to permit federal 
funding of nonreproductive cloning, which will necessitate further deliberations on how such 
funding ought to be regulated. 
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As a criterion for justification, reasonableness is meant to be a generic one, meaning that 
it should not have features that lead it to prejudge the debate over a particular issue, such as the 
morality of federally funding SCNT for scientific research.  Rather, reasonableness may be 
defined in terms of generally agreed-upon principles for public deliberation, including 
coherence, consistency, fairness, and soundness. The inspiration for this sense of reasonableness 
comes from John Rawls.  For Rawls,  
Persons are reasonable in one basic aspect when, among equals say, they are ready to 
propose principles and standards as fair terms of cooperation and to abide by them 
willingly, given the assurance that others will likewise do so.  Those norms they view as 
reasonable for everyone to accept and therefore as justifiable to them; and they are ready 
to discuss the fair terms that others propose. […] Reasonable persons, we say, are not 
moved by the general good as such but desire for its own sake a social world in which 
they, as free and equal, can cooperate with others on terms all can accept (Rawls 2005, 
pp. 49-50; italics added). 
Adopting the standard of reasonableness provides an avenue for fairly criticizing the 
simple argument without requiring a foray into the issue of where human life begins.  Rather, all 
that is required is to successfully challenge the identity claim encapsulated in Premise 4, between 
the referent of “human embryo” and the referent of “the product of somatic cell nuclear transfer.” 
Since the simple argument does not include assumptions about the contentious issue of when 
human life begins, one need not engage with this issue in order to determine whether funding 
experimentation upon clone embryos is morally permissible. To determine whether such funding 
is permissible instead requires determining (a) whether clone embryos are identical to human 
embryos, which are granted moral status by stipulation in this work, or (b) whether clone 
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embryos warrant moral status on grounds independent from, though analogous to the grounds for 
attributing moral status to human embryos. To determine this, it is necessary to define the 
meanings of the terms “human embryo,” “clone embryo,” and “parthenote” in a way that they 
are seen as “terms all can accept” when taking part in policymaking deliberations. I submit that 
these terms refer to biological entities best described in terms of the steps necessary for their 
persistent development.  Once these defining features have been made explicit, it will become 
clear that the products of SCNT may be distinguished from both human embryos and 
parthenotes.  Thus, the simple argument is shown to be unsound because the identity relation it 
posits is shown to rest on shaky ground.  However, one may nevertheless hold that clone 
embryos deserve moral status on other grounds, principle among them being that they are 
capable of developing into entities that warrant moral status, such as fetuses or neonates, 
irrespective of whether they are identical to human embryos. Whether this view is persuasive 
depends on whether it seems likely that clone embryos have this capability, which I will argue 
they do not. 
2.2 The Human Embryo as the Product of Fertilization 
The first term in need of clarification is “human embryo.” In order to be precise about the 
referent of this term it is necessary to review the cellular biology of fertilization and 
embryogenesis.  The formation of a human embryo via natural or artificial fertilization begins 
with the fusion of male and female gametes, or sperm and egg, and ends with a two-celled 
zygote.  In natural fertilization, this process occurs in the fallopian tube and takes about a day to 
complete. It is depicted in Figure 1.   
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In the first step of fertilization, the female haploid nucleus undergoes duplication to form 
the female pronucleus. The pronucleus has 46 chromosomes; however, in the pronucleus these 
46 chromosomes stem from only one parent.  As is shown in Figure 1-A, the female pronucleus 
forms when gametic chromosomes duplicate.  After a single spermatozoon passes through the 
protective shell surrounding the oocyte (the zona pellucida), the sperm and egg membranes fuse 
and the male haploid nucleus is released into the cytoplasm, where it then duplicates to form the 
male pronucleus (Figure 1, B and C).  Toward the end of fertilization, the male and female 
pronuclei briefly come into contact and exchange chromosomes (Figure 1-D).  The pronuclei 
then undergo syngamy, a poorly understood process whereby the two haploid sets of parental 
chromosomes organize together, merge, and migrate (Figure 1-E) to prepare for the initial 
division of the fertilized egg.  The steps of fertilization are also called zygosis, because their 
culmination results in the formation of a zygote – a two-celled entity that is the starting point of 
embryogenesis, a process including the formation and development of a human embryo (Figure 
1-F).  
After zygosis, the human embryo undergoes the first stage of cleavage.  In this process, 
the two-celled embryo grows via a special type of cellular division; wherein the number of cells, 
called blastomeres, increases geometrically while the total volume of the embryo remains 
constant.  Within three days after fertilization, the embryo takes on a shape resembling a 
mulberry, which is a tightly compacted formation of growing blastomeres termed a morula 
(Figure 1-G).  By the fourth or fifth day after the initiation of fertilization, the embryo is 
considered a blastocyst, the stage at which a cavity first appears inside the morula (Alberts et al. 
2002, pp. 1139-1156; Guenin 2008, pp. 4-5).  The importance of the blastocyst stage cannot be 
overstated; the late blastocyst stage marks the moment when embryonic cells exhibit their first 
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differentiation into three regions, as depicted in Figure 1-H: (i) trophoblast, the exterior cellular 
membrane of the blastocyst; (ii) inner cell mass (ICM), the group of totipotent and pluripotent 
cells in the interior of the blastocyst; and (iii) blastocystic cavity, the internal space 
distinguishing the ICM from the trophoblast (O’Rahilly and Müller 2001, pp. 38-39).  Between 
the fifth and seventh days after fertilization, the blastocyst moves through the fallopian tube 
towards the uterus.  In order for a human embryo to develop into a fetus, the blastocyst must 
hatch from the zona pellucida and implant in the uterine wall.  Human embryos that fail to do 
this will not undergo gestation, the process in which embryonic cells specialize and take on 
distinct roles.   
 
 
Figure 1. Human fertilization (A-F) and early embryogenesis (G-H). See text for explanation. 
Adapted from Sadler (2000) and O’Rahilily and Müller (2001). 
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Fertilization naturally occurs within a fallopian tube over a few days, after which 
embryogenesis takes place in a woman’s uterus.  In light of this, I follow Lewis Guenin in 
referring to embryos that originate in or enter into a uterus and a connected fallopian tube as 
enabled embryos, because they meet the minimum environmental conditions necessary for 
beginning the developmental cascade into later stage embryos, fetuses, and neonates.  There are 
two ways for an embryo to be enabled: by originating in a uterus, as in natural fertilization, or by 
being transferred into a uterus prior to the seventh day after fertilization, such as occurs in the 
case of IVF.  With this vocabulary, we may also distinguish another category of embryos, 
unenabled embryos—those that never exist in a uterus and connected fallopian tube (Guenin 
2008, pp. 21 and 27-31).  This distinction is useful because it provides language for describing a 
difference in types of embryos in terms of their presence in an environment that is required for 
their further development, rather than in terms of their origins.  Whether they arise from artificial 
or natural fertilization, cloning, parthenogenesis, or some other process, all embryos may be 
separated into the classes of enabled and unenabled, its opposite.10   
 
2.3 The Clone Embryo as the Product of SCNT 
In 2008, a team of scientists made the first, and until very recently the only, successful attempt to 
produce a blastocyst-stage clone embryo (French et al. 2008).11  In describing their work they 
                                                
10 The distinction between enabled and unenabled embryos will be elaborated upon further in § 3.2 
11 Infamously, a team of researchers led by Hwang Woo-suk first published a report claiming to have 
successfully performed SCNT in humans in 2005, though this report was later retracted due to scientific 
misconduct.  For citations to the original paper and information on this controversy, see Cho, McGee, and 
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state that producing a blastocyst via SCNT requires four major steps, which I take to describe the 
origins and developmental stages of the product of SCNT. 
The first two steps are to prepare the nucleus and oocyte to fuse together to become the 
entity from which the clone embryo is derived.  In the first step, the cumulus matrix of the oocyte 
is removed, followed by the removal of the oocyte’s nucleus.  To remove the cumulus matrix, an 
enzymatic solution is gently pipetted into the viscous matrix surrounding the oocyte, breaking it 
down and dislodging it.  After the oocyte is incubated for forty-five minutes, the nucleus is 
removed, either by aspiration through a pipette or by extrusion through a small slit cut in the 
zona pellucida.  After the second step of SCNT, wherein human skin cells (fibroblasts) are 
selected according to the likelihood they are in the ideal phase of cellular development for 
nuclear transfer, G1 or G0, the enucleated oocyte and fibroblast are ready to be fused.  In the 
third step, the somatic cell is inserted underneath the zona pellucida so that it comes into contact 
with the internal membrane of the enucleated egg cell.  Introduced into a buffer solution in which 
they receive rapid, repeated electrical stimulation, the fibroblast and oocyte are stimulated to 
fuse.  After fusion, the resulting entity is an enucleated egg cell containing a single somatic cell 
nucleus.  This new product must undergo parthenogenetic activation, whereby the cell is 
chemically stimulated to undergo the symphony of genetic events which initiate duplication and 
division.  Parthenogenetic activation occurs when cells incubating in fusion buffer are rapidly 
moved into a second buffer for four minutes and then incubated in a third buffer for three to four 
hours.   
                                                                                                                                                       
Magnus (2006) and the special online section devoted to it by the journal, Science, which originally 
published the fraudulent research (Science 2011). 
 22 
If each of the four steps of SCNT has been carried out successfully, then in another six to 
seven hours the fused cell will have been remodeled, meaning that its nucleus will have been 
returned to a pronuclear state.  This results in a single-cell entity undergoing parthenogenesis, 
the growth of an embryo without fertilization.  In another day, after initial cleavage has occurred, 
the product of successful SCNT will be a clone embryo, a two-celled embryo created by the four 
major steps of SCNT.  In theory, after a clone embryo reaches the blastocyst stage, the inner cell 
mass can be removed and cultivated further, creating an autologous stem cell line for use in 
scientific research (Vats et al. 2005).  However, this has proven to be difficult to do in practice. 
2.4 Clone Embryos and Human Embryos are Not Identical 
I propose to distinguish among different types of embryos which have (1) different origins, (2) 
different developmental pathways, and consequently, (3) different developmental potentials.  
Doing so suggests clear reasons for the reevaluation and reinterpretation of existing public 
policies for funding stem cell research, including policies prohibiting public funding of somatic 
cell nuclear transfer.  Additionally, distinguishing among classes of embryos will shed light on 
some ethical problems brought about by current and future advancements in biotechnology. 
On my account, human embryos are entities that originate via fertilization, whether in 
vivo or in vitro, as described above.  Although the process has not been described in full 
mechanistic detail here,12 what we do know about fertilization suggests that the following are 
necessary moments in a human embryo’s developmental path: the formation of the female 
pronucleus, the activation of the oocyte by the fusion of the sperm membrane with the zona 
                                                
12 For such detail, see O’Rahilly and Müller (2001). 
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pellucida, the formation of the male pronucleus, and zygosis, which immediately results in a two-
celled zygote and includes syngamy and the first division.  After the first division, a human 
embryo undergoes cleavage sequentially until it reaches the blastocyst stage.  An enabled 
embryo may then undergo gestation, after which it has the developmental potential to become a 
fetus, and ultimately, a neonate. 
A clone embryo is an entity that originates from somatic cell nuclear transfer.13  There are 
four major steps to SCNT, suggesting that the following are necessary moments in a clone 
embryo’s developmental path: the donor cells are altered from their native states in order to 
prepare them to be capable of embryological development; the somatic nucleus is introduced into 
the oocyte after fusion; the immediately resulting single-celled entity is stimulated to undergo 
parthenogenetic activation; and, the donated nucleus undergoes remodeling. After remodeling, a 
clone embryo undergoes its initial cleavage, which results in a two-clled entity that can in theory 
be used for research or reproductive purposes.   
My proposal to distinguish between different classes of embryos is not a novel one.  For 
example, the PCBE Report from the President’s Council on Bioethics represents the different 
entities it discusses by distinguishing among their origins (Figure 2).  The PCBE Report employs 
terminology that is almost identical to my own: it refers to the process from which embryos 
originate as “fertilization” and refers to the process whereby clone embryos originate as 
“cloning.”  In cloning, an egg cell is enucleated, a donor cell is fused to that egg cell, the 
                                                
13 Following Guenin (2008), I propose to call the product of SCNT a clone embryo, as in a ‘mouse 
embryo’ or ‘mammalian embryo’.  This locution is preferable to a similar one, cloned embryo, because it 
accurately implies that the embryo is the product of cloning by SCNT, rather than that the embryo is a 
copy of its progenitor.  Saying ‘cloned’ embryo is inaccurate because clone embryos contain DNA from 
both their gametic and somatic sources.   
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resulting cell is activated, and the result is a “cloned embryo” (President’s Council on Bioethics 
2002a, p. 61). 
 
Figure 2: A depiction of different embryo types and their origins. From the President’s 
Council on Bioethics report, Human Cloning and Human Dignity: “Diagram of early stages of 
human fertilization, cloning, and parthenogenesis” (President’s Council on Bioethics 2002a, p. 
61). 
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The PCBE is perhaps the most thoughtful governmental body to have considered the 
morality of federally funding cloning for therapeutic research – that is, for research rather than 
for reproduction.  For precisely this reason, it is all the more troubling that their reasoning is 
flawed, as it is encapsulated in Figure 2.  To see their error, recall that the earliest stage of 
embryological development, a zygote, is a two-cell stage, which, in total, contains 92 
chromosomes, or two copies of the entity’s 46 nuclear chromosomes.  Yet, in the PCBE diagram 
we see that their third stage of fertilization is a single-cell zygote containing 46 chromosomes.  
Comparing this diagram to Figure 1 reveals that the PCBE Report makes a false assumption, that 
embryos undergo a single-cell stage of development that has the identical number of 
chromosomes as the resulting zygote. But, they do not.14  
The importance of recognizing this error stems from the fact that the diagram in Figure 2 
makes no other errors: it represents cloning and parthenogenesis faithfully.  Each of these 
processes includes a single-cell stage.  These cells may undergo parthenogenetic activation, and 
under laboratory conditions may develop further, perhaps even to the blastocyst stage.  But, the 
embryo does not undergo parthenogenetic activation, because it does not originate in a single-
cell stage.  Rather, the embryo undergoes zygotic activation, which is a distinct process that 
results in a blastocyst with high probability. 
It is reasonable to ask whether parthenogenetic activation and zygotic activation are 
simply two terms to refer to the same process, or perhaps two terms referring to different ways in 
                                                
14 To be fair, this error is not uncommon. Others who have made it include Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer 
(in Kuhse and Singer 1990, p. 66ff.) and David DeGrazia (2006, p. 50). Yet, others also appreciate the 
implications a distinction between the fertilized egg and the resultant two-cell zygote has for ethical and 
policy issues (e.g., Grobstein 1985; Cohen and Tomkin 1994; Cameron and Williamson 2005).  
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which the same process can be instantiated.  The honest answer is that we do not know.  
Embryogenesis and parthenogenesis are poorly understood, so a definitive answer remains 
unavailable.  However, one very basic fact suggests they are different processes: without 
intervention and under natural environmental conditions, human parthenotes never develop past 
the blastocyst stage, while the majority of human embryos do develop past that stage under the 
same conditions.  Parthenotes that continue to develop do not “develop” per se: they become 
cystic and enlarge like cancerous masses. Recent experiments have shed light on why this might 
be. 
 
 
Figure 3: Zygotic genome activation of four types of embryos: human embryo, 761/761 
transcripts; parthenote, 536/761 transcripts; clone embryo, 124/761 transcripts; inhibited human 
embryo, 62/761 transcripts (see Noggle et al. 2011). 
To examine whether different types of embryos exhibit different patterns of gene 
expression, scientists mapped a set of 761 genes that are highly active during the very beginning 
of embryogenesis at zygotic activation. They then compared the expression rates of three 
different types of embryos to this level of activation, which they termed zygotic gene activation.  
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They found that parthenotes express 70% of the zygotic genome, clone embryos express 16%, 
and human embryos treated with alpha amanitin (which prevents DNA from being transcribed 
into proteins) express 8%.  Using gene activity as a measure, parthenotes were shown to have 
significantly different expression rates than human embryos, and clone embryos were shown to 
express roughly 16% – or less than one sixth – of the genes active in a human embryo (Noggle et 
al. 2011, pp. 71-72).  
 The genetic expression profiles of clone embryos are markedly different than those of 
human embryos.  In fact, they show far more similarity to human embryos whose development 
has been chemically arrested than to developing human embryos.  Experiments were not done to 
see whether clone embryos and parthenotes exhibit similarities in a parthenogenetic activation 
genome. However, given that neither of these types of embryos develops past the earliest 
blastocyst stage, without intervention they seem far more similar to one another than either is to 
a human embryo originating from fertilization.  Thus, clone embryos are ontologically different 
from human embryos because they have different developmental potentials, evidenced by their 
different origins and developmental paths, and substantiated by genetic measures of potential. 
I use the term “ontologically” here to describe the differences between human and clone 
embryos because what I have just discussed are differences in the ways that these entities come 
into existence. And, these differences in their processes of coming into being causally bear on 
the developmental potentials the resultant entities have. I take ontology to be concerned with 
claims about what things exist, including how things come to be, and once they exist, how they 
persist or change over time, and therefore what they are capable of becoming. In the case of 
human and clone embryos, I have distinguished these two types of entities according to 
differences in the way they come into being (their origins) and the way that they persist or 
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change over time (their developmental pathways). Because of these differences, I contend that 
these entities have different developmental potentials, different capabilities to become various 
sorts of entities, particularly morally salient beings like human fetuses or neonates and beings 
like groups of stem cells or other cellular entities. 
Human embryos arise from fertilization, a process that originates in the joining of two 
23-chromosome cells, human egg and sperm, under conditions that occur naturally and 
frequently and are thus easy to replicate in vivo or in vitro. Their initial changes over time 
include the chromosomal material duplicating, coming together, and segregating, in order to 
form a 92-chromosome, 2-cell entity, or a zygote. Human embryos do not originate in, nor do 
they exhibit a single-cell state.  
A clone embryo differs, however. In the few reported circumstances of the creation of 
clone embryos, they arise from SCNT, a process that originates with the manipulation and 
joining of a human egg cell containing no chromosomes and the nucleus of a somatic cell 
containing 46 chromosomes, under specific laboratory conditions that are not easy to replicate in 
vitro and that cannot be replicated in vivo. Their initial changes over time are not well 
understood, although they at least include the formation of a single 46-chromosome cell that then 
duplicates to form a 92-chromosome, two-cell entity.  
It is unclear whether the term “zygote” is accurate for the entity that results from SCNT, 
because this implies that the entity will undergo zygotic activation and proximal downstream 
stages of development.15 I have argued that empirical research suggests this is not the case. The 
                                                
15 Paul McHugh agrees with my intuition that the product of SCNT should not be referred to as a 
“zygote.” Rather, he suggests that the product of SCNT for non-reproductive purposes is akin a cell 
 29 
two-cell entity that results from SCNT expresses one sixth of the genes of a normally developing 
human embryo at this stage of cellular development. By comparison, a human parthenote, an 
entity that is certain not to undergo zygotic activation and subsequent developmental stages, 
expresses two thirds of the genes of a normally developing human embryo. Thus, since we know 
that expressing two thirds of the genes leads to a cell type with a distinct developmental pathway 
from the pathway of the human embryo, I maintain this gives overwhelming reasons to conclude 
that the same is true of a cell type that expresses one sixth of the genes. And I conclude these are 
differences in the way these entities come into being and develop over time. Hence, they are 
ontological differences. 
 These ontological differences matter for the simple argument, because Premise 4 (the 
claim that SCNT harms human embryos because the product of SCNT is identical to a human 
embryo) denies there are such differences. The imagery in Figure 2 captures the fourth premise 
better than can be expressed by words. Through it, doubt may be cast on the claim that SCNT 
produces a human embryo.  Human embryos have the developmental potential to produce human 
fetuses and neonates.  Like parthenotes, clone embryos do not.  Human embryos originate from 
fertilization.  Like parthenotes, clone embryos do not.  Given these differences, clone embryos 
and parthenotes should be distinguished from human embryos on account of the patent 
differences between their origins, developmental pathways, and developmental potentials.  As 
such, if one is engaging in reasonable argument using terms upon which we all can agree, then 
one should conclude that clone embryos are not human embryos in the sense of that term 
necessary for the simple argument to be sound. Hence, the simple argument fails.  
                                                                                                                                                       
culture. Consequently, he proposes that to capture the differences between the cellular product of IVF, 
which is an embryo, and the product of SCNT, we refer to the latter as a “clonote” (McHugh 2004, 210). 
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3.0  CLONE EMBRYOS, HUMAN EMBRYOS, AND MORAL STATUS  
The criticism of the simple argument given in the previous chapter will provoke various 
responses. One strategy could be to respond to the ontological claims made in chapter 2 by 
arguing clone embryos and human embryos are identical based on biological research that 
counters what is presented above or at least shows the evidence marshaled to be problematic, 
because it is based on experiments of poor quality or suffers from other limitations. Another 
strategy would be to accept the reasoning in chapter 2 but nevertheless to argue clone embryos 
deserve moral status based on grounds that are independent from their putative identity with 
human embryos. If so, then the simple argument could be reasonably modified irrespective of 
whether clone embryos are identical to human embryos. A third strategy would be to argue that 
in making science funding policy it may not be necessary to consider the sort of scientific models 
and evidence I have discussed in order to make justified policies, and thus the ontological issues 
I raise do not bear on the issue of what policies ought to be established for publicly funding 
nonreproductive cloning research. 
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In this chapter I focus on the second of these two possible responses to my argument.16 I 
begin by considering traditional approaches to grounding attributions of moral status, in section 
3.1. I distinguish between two overarching strategies for grounding such claims. One is based on 
the origins of the target entity, specifically whether it is of human parentage. The other is based 
on whether the target entity has morally relevant capacities, such as the ability to feel pain, 
cognitive capacities, or capacities for moral agency. I argue that clone embryos are not 
candidates for moral status based on these traditional approaches. However, I acknowledge that 
other routes are available for attributing moral status. In section 3.2, I consider whether it is 
possible to argue that clone embryos deserve moral status based on their potential to become 
entities that have morally relevant capacities, and I find this argument to be unsatisfying given 
our understanding of clone embryos’ developmental potentials. Then, I turn to considering 
whether it might be possible to support the attribution of moral status by arguing that clone 
embryos have the potential to produce entities that have morally salient capacities if one 
manipulates them or their cellular derivatives using biotechnologies. This lengthy section 
includes a minor digression on the question of whether, given my arguments against arguments 
from potentiality in the case of clone embryos, I contend that arguments from potentiality are 
proven to be unimportant by considerations of recent advances in stem cell science (§ 3.3.2). 
Despite my rejection of the specific arguments from potentiality I consider in this chapter, I 
conclude that this is not the case. Arguments from potentiality can be useful and important. 
Indeed, I conclude (§ 3.4) by summarizing what we learn by considering its applications of 
                                                
16 In the next chapter I will focus on the third possible response. I will not discuss the first response 
further because I am not aware of scientific evidence that might counter my claims about the ontological 
differences between human and clone embryos. If I knew of such evidence, I would have cited it above. 
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arguments from potentiality to the particular case of non-reproductive cloning, which is that the 
prohibition on public funding for this activity cannot be justified by an argument from 
potentiality; and, from demonstrating this we learn important information about the assumptions 
of proponents of prohibition. 
3.1 The Retreat to Moral Status 
I will call the response that clone embryos deserve moral status irrespective of their putative 
identity with human embryos the retreat to moral status. As a response to my argument, it can be 
shown to be a move of considerable desperation.  First, notice how much this maneuver 
concedes.  As I maintained in the first chapter, the simple argument is not merely an argument 
that would support a prohibition on federal funding, it is in fact the argument that has 
traditionally been used to support the actual prohibition in place.  So while a retreat to moral 
status may be an alternative means for justifying the prohibition, it is one that is employed at the 
cost of conceding that the previous justification was unsatisfactory.  Despite this, the argument 
from moral status may succeed where the simple argument from identity fails.  We must ask, 
then, what justifies an attribution of moral status to clone embryos? 
 The topic of moral status is a contentious one. Although there are a number of strategies 
for grounding attributions of moral status, it is not clear that any of them is satisfactory. And this 
is especially the case if the strategy is designed to justify a necessary and sufficient condition for 
attributing moral status, rather than only a sufficient condition. However, there appears to be 
consensus on what “moral status” is, even if there is evident dis-consensus regarding how to 
discern it. For example, Beauchamp and Childress define moral status as an entity being in such 
a state that it deserves the protection afforded by moral norms, “such as principles, obligations, 
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duties, or rights” (2009, p. 66).  Thus, to have moral status is to be the sort of entity that other 
entities beholden to moral norms ought to recognize as a moral being, as also being properly 
covered by those norms, though perhaps not equally as other moral beings.  
 Beauchamp and Childress characterize four approaches for characterizing sufficient 
conditions for attributing moral status. The first they suggest “might be called the traditional 
account of moral status” (ibid., p. 67). On this view, an entity has moral status if it is conceived 
by human parents, or perhaps alternatively, if it has a human genome. Some authors refer to this 
as “speciesism,” which singles out membership in Homo sapiens as a necessary condition for 
moral status. However I focus on a weaker position, which I refer to as the anthropocentric 
approach to attributing moral status (Piotrowska forthcoming) because this term draws attention 
to the view’s emphasis on membership in Homo sapiens as a sufficient condition for moral 
status. This is the approach that lies behind the simple argument as it is given in section 1.2. On 
this view, embryos are afforded moral status because they are produced via conception, whether 
the process of conception occurs in vivo or in vitro. Therefore, if something is an embryo, then it 
deserves moral status. And since proponents of prohibition propose that clone embryos are 
identical to human embryos, they therefore conclude that clone embryos deserve moral status, 
just as human embryos do.17  
                                                
17 Indeed, the example that Beauchamp and Childress cite to demonstrate the anthropocentric approach is 
from two members of the PCBE who argue for the simple argument. They quote Robert George and 
Alfonso Gomez-Lobo as follows. “Fertilization produces a new and complete, though immature, human 
organism. The same is true of successful cloning. Cloned embryos therefore ought to be treated as having 
the same moral status as other human embryos. A human embryo is a whole living member of the species 
Homo sapiens in the earliest stage…Human embryos possess the epigenetic primordial for self-directed 
growth into adulthood. We were then, as we are now distinct and complete…To deny that embryonic 
human beings deserve full respect, one must suppose that not every whole living human being is 
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 My argument against the simple argument may be carried over mutatis mutandis to an 
anthropocentric approach to attributing moral status to clone embryos. In chapter 2, I argued that 
clone embryos and human embryos are ontologically different. Therefore, even granting for the 
sake of argument that human embryos deserve moral status on grounds of their being conceived 
by human parents, if my argument holds, then the same cannot be said for clone embryos. Thus, 
clone embryos would not warrant moral status based on the considerations of the anthropocentric 
approach. 
 The anthropocentric approach rests on claims about the origins of entities. On it, moral 
status is conferred to entities that arise from conception, though allowing for artificial means of 
performing this activity. The other approaches for attributing moral status that Beauchamp and 
Childress describe differ in that they do not rest on claims about entities’ origins. Instead, they 
focus on the capacities these entities have for exhibiting certain morally relevant properties (cf. 
Laio 2010). Beauchamp and Childress distinguish three different properties that have been used 
for attributing moral status, cognitive properties, including awareness, perception, memory, 
understanding, and reflection; moral properties, such as a capacity to make moral judgments and 
to have motives that are open to judgment by others; and, affective properties, most notably, the 
ability to feel pain, or sentience (Beauchamp and Childress 2009, pp. 71-79). 
                                                                                                                                                       
deserving of full respect. To do that, one must hold that those human beings who deserve full respect 
deserve it not in virtue of the kind of entity they are, but, rather, in virtue of some acquired characteristic 
that some human beings…have and others do not, and which some human beings have in greater degree 
than others…[Even embryos] are quire unlike cats and does…As humans they are members of a natural 
kind—the human species…Since human beings are intrinsically valuable and deserving of full moral 
respect in virtue of what they are, it follows that they are intrinsically valuable from the point at which 
they come into beings (George and Gomez-Lobo 2005; quoted in Beauchamp and Childress 2009, pp. 67-
68). 
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 There are thus two traditional types of moral classification, in terms of a type of entity’s 
origins or its capacities to exhibit morally salient properties (Piotrowska forthcoming).18 I have 
already suggested why emphasizing the origins of clone embryos is not a basis for attributing 
moral status to them. I believe it is even easier to see why they would not warrant moral status on 
a capacities approach. Clone embryos are not capable of exhibiting cognitive properties, moral 
properties, or affective properties. They are not aware and cannot think, perceive, and so forth. 
They also cannot make moral judgments. Nor can they feel pain, because they lack the necessary 
biological structures to feel pain. 
 If the retreat to moral status is understood as a retreat to one of the traditional approaches 
for grounding attributions of moral status, it is thus shown to be an unsuccessful move. Clone 
embryos lack the relevant capacities or origins upon which a successful attribution might be 
grounded. However, proponents of prohibiting publicly funding SCNT may respond another 
way. Rather than emphasizing the capacities a clone embryo has, they might emphasize the 
capacities that a clone embryo has the capacity to have. That is, one might respond to my 
discussion thus far in this chapter by claiming that it is appropriate to ground an attribution of 
moral status on an entity’s current capacity to exhibit morally relevant capacities in the future, 
rather than its exhibiting morally relevant capacities in the present. The rest of this chapter 
explores this possibility. 
                                                
18 My argument against the simple argument may not fit with this distinction between two types of moral 
classification, because I claim that to distinguish a type of entity that does not have moral status (clone 
embryos) from a type that does (human embryos) requires considering their origins, developmental 
pathways, and developmental potentials. Thus, I may be arguing for a non-reductive account of moral 
classification, although considering this possibility is beyond the scope of the present discussion (see 
Cunningham in press). 
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3.2 Status and the Potential to Become 
Before I consider and respond to this intuition, it is first important to underscore how far away 
from the simple argument we have traveled. No longer are we discussing whether clone embryos 
are identical to human embryos, and thus deserving of moral status. Nor are we discussing 
whether clone embryos exhibit certain capacities or properties that warrant the attribution of 
moral status. Instead it is being proposed that clone embryos warrant the attribution of moral 
status because they have a second-order capacity to develop at some later time a first-order 
capacity that in turn warrants the attribution of moral status. On this view, the following 
assumption must be made: Even if x at t1 lacks a morally relevant capacity, as long as x has the 
capacity to develop the morally relevant capacity at t2, x has moral status at t1.19  I find this 
premise dubious, however, as we will see below, if it is granted then a number of objections to 
my conclusions follow.  
 There are two possible responses to my argument that appeal to second-order capacities. 
Because each focuses on the clone embryo’s potential to develop into an entity that warrants the 
attribution of moral status, both are arguments from potentiality. Taking these arguments 
seriously requires distinguishing between different senses of potential, which is understood best 
in terms of either producing or becoming (Buckle 1988).  To have potential in the sense of 
becoming – or being capable of developing into something – a target entity must maintain its 
identity through a developmental process; it must persist despite its change from one state to 
another. To have potential in the sense of producing, a target entity must be capable of being 
manipulated such that it results in an entity that warrants the attribution of moral status on other 
                                                
19 I thank Mark Wicclair for helping me formulate this assumption and make it explicit. 
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grounds. Thus, one might adopt the second-order capacities approach in two ways, by asserting 
that clone embryos have the potential to become entities that exhibit first-order capacities or by 
asserting that clone embryos have the potential to produce entities that exhibit first-order 
capacities. I will focus on the former line of reasoning in this section and the latter in the 
following section. 
 To begin, I will consider all of the second-order capacities approaches at once, rather than 
distinguish different morally relevant first-order capacities and argue against each of them 
separately in their second-order guises. Irrespective of one’s intuitions about which morally 
relevant first-order property is the right one, an argument based on the intuition that bearing 
second-order capacities is sufficient to warrant the attribution of moral status will rest on the 
claim that the entity under consideration has the relevant second-order capacity. If we take an 
ideally moral human agent as a model of an entity that warrants the attribution of status, we may 
say that such an entity normally develops each of these capacities over time, beginning with 
sentience, then to cognition, and finally to moral reflection. Yet, other entities may warrant moral 
status that develop differently: they may never realize the capacity of moral reflection or they 
may never realize the capacity of cognition. However, it is reasonable to assume that if an entity 
warrants the attribution of moral status, then it will at least have the capacity to develop 
sentience, which, under normal circumstances, arises earlier in development than capacities for 
cognition or moral agency.20 It is also reasonable to think that under normal circumstances the 
                                                
20 Given that some human beings may develop capacities for cognition and moral reflection without 
developing the ability to feel pain (Cox et al. 2006), it is possible to dissociate sentience from other moral 
developmental capacities. However, this neuropathy is very rare and clearly pathological, so it does not 
disturb the intuition that under normal conditions sentience arises before other morally relevant capacities. 
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development of the capacity to feel pain is biologically less complex than the other capacities 
that are traditionally appealed to as warranting attribution of moral status. Thus, as I endeavor to 
show that a clone embryo lacks the second-order capacity to develop any of these morally 
relevant first-order capacities, I will focus only on the presumably most proximal and least 
complex of these morally relevant developmental milestones, sentience, or the first-order 
capacity to feel pain. 
 In order to develop pain, an entity must have certain biological properties. It must have 
developed certain neural pathways and structures, and chemical systems associated with the 
transmission of pain through the sensory and nervous systems (Steinbock 2006, n. 14).  Recent 
estimates suggest that for a human embryo this might occur as early as 17 gestational weeks 
(Glover and Fisk 1996) or as late as 29 gestational weeks (Lee et al. 2005). Either way, it is clear 
that in order for a human embryo to develop the capacity for sentience the embryo must be 
implanted in a uterus; furthermore, it must be sufficiently viable to persist in the intrauterine 
environment for a number of weeks. The question is thus whether clone embryos have both of 
these relevant second-order capacities of (i) a capacity to be implanted in a uterus and (ii) a 
capacity to persist in the intrauterine environment for a number of weeks subsequent to 
implantation.  
There are two reasons to think that clone embryos used for stem cell research will not 
have either of these relevant second-order capacities.  First, following Guenin’s proposal 
discussed in chapter 2, I contend that clone embryos should only be developed if cell donors (of 
oocytes and fibroblasts) have autonomously expressed preferences precluding the enablement of 
                                                                                                                                                       
Yet it does show that in very rare cases sentience need not arise before them. This pathology further 
confirms the intuition that sentience is at most a sufficient condition for moral status. 
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any resulting clone embryos.  Thus, clone embryos would, as a class, remain unenabled; hence, 
they cannot be inserted into a uterus without violating a legal and moral prohibition.  Thus, even 
granting for the sake of argument that they have the other relevant second-order moral capacity, 
they will, nevertheless, not develop past the blastocyst stage due to an explicit prohibition.21   
Distinguishing between enabled and unenabled embryos draws attention to an important 
precondition for becoming an enabled embryo. Embryos do not just arise de novo. In order for an 
embryo to come into being, human beings must perform activities that cause them to develop. 
That is, until very recently, the only source of human embryos in all of human history was from 
sexual intercourse and conception. Both sperm and egg were required to produce human 
embryos, thus both women and men were required. And embryos routinely arose in a context 
such that they once they were unenabled they could not later be reenabled. Embryos could not 
exit the intrauterine environment and then return. 
Yet, now, this is no longer the case. The introduction of artificial means for fertilization 
in vitro now make it possible to produce an embryo outside of a woman’s body. Yet it is still the 
case that sperm and egg are required. Since sperm and egg must be donated by individuals in 
                                                
21 This point may also be raised as regards its application to human embryos produced via IVF.  One 
might wonder, does this mean that left over IVF human embryos also do not have moral status, presuming 
they are prohibited from enablement, and hence, do not have the chance to develop further to gain the 
capacity necessary to be attributed moral status?  It is important to recognize that by accepting Premise 2 
of the simple argument these issues are thereby muted.  It is accepted that all human embryos, including 
those produced by IVF, have moral status based on their origins.  Thus, whether they are unenabled or 
not, they still have that status, merely by stipulation.  Now, important controversies might result from 
accepting this stipulation, e.g., regarding the morality of freezing or destroying leftover IVF embryos.  
And, these are no doubt important issues.  However, they are not the issues that concern the current 
argument, which is not about all of the many ethical issues that would follow from accepting for the sake 
of argument that human embryos have moral status.  
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order to be available for conception ex vivo, this activity still requires women and men. 
Distinguishing between enabled and unenabled embryos draws attention to the fact that in order 
to create embryos ex vivo a donor must consent to the harvesting of his or her material. As this is 
the case, they have the moral authority to constrain what is done with their biologic material after 
harvesting. That is, they, and they alone, have the moral authority to consent to research 
practices with their biologic material under traditional accounts of ethical human subjects 
research (Luna and Macklin 2009). Thus, in cases of ex vivo conception, only if those who 
donate their biologic material authorize it is it morally permissible to enable embryos.  
Some may argue that sperm and egg donors lack the moral authority to justify donating 
their cells under the explicit assumption that embryos will be created out of them, nor do they 
have the moral authority to justify donating human embryos for research. However, no one can 
plausibly claim that someone else has that moral authority. Thus, if anyone has the moral 
authority to autonomously authorize that their own biologic material is used for the purposes of 
creating human embryos, then it is the persons from whom that biologic material has been 
harvested (Warren 1990, p. 126). Therefore, if there is anyone with the moral authority to 
prohibit some class of embryos from ever being enabled, then that moral authority rests at some 
point with the persons who choose to donate their biologic material, including oocytes. Thus, 
with this distinction we may recognize that in the case of artificially produced embryos – 
whether by artificial fertilization, in vitro parthenogenesis, or SCNT – if anyone has the moral 
authority to authorize that cellular material be used to produce human embryos, then those who 
donate the cellular material for manipulation and experimentation are the only persons with the 
moral authority to authorize enablement. And moreover, we may follow Geunin’s analysis and 
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recognize that a prohibition  on enablement should be required for any biologic material that is 
donated for the purpose of research on cloning (Geunin 2008, pp. 27ff.). 
Of course prohibitions fail when people choose to flout them. And they are only as good 
as our enforcement of them. So, this reason will not be compelling to the skeptic.  A second, 
stronger reason clone embryos used for research purposes cannot develop the capacity to feel 
pain is that the process of isolating stem cells from a clone embryo alters it such that the 
remaining tissue is incapable of further development, even if it were transferred into a uterus, 
and even – granting again for the sake of argument – if we presuppose that the clone embryo had 
the second-order capacity necessary to develop further in the uterus.  To isolate stem cells, the 
trophoblast of an embryo is destroyed and the inner cell mass is selected for using a specific 
nutritional medium (Lanzendorf, Boyd, and Wright 2004).  Since the trophoblast is necessary for 
implantation, using a clone embryo to produce a stem cell line excludes the possibility of also 
using it for reproductive purposes: nothing remains that is capable of developing into an embryo, 
and hence, nothing remains that could undergo embryogenesis.  
Thus, when a clone embryo is used for research purposes it is incapable of developing the 
capacity to feel pain, both because it is unenabled and incapable of developing past the blastocyst 
stage.  Therefore, the claim that clone embryos produced for research deserve moral status 
cannot be supported on the basis of a second-order capacity to develop a morally relevant first-
order capacity, whether that capacity is to feel pain, to be cognitive, or to morally reflect.  
3.3 Status and the Potential to Produce 
Proponents of prohibiting publicly funding nonreproductive cloning might still argue that 
although it may not be possible for clone embryos to become entities that develop morally 
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relevant second-order capacities, it is possible to use clone embryos to produce stem cells and 
then use those cells to produce such entities. That is, it might be claims that it is possible to take 
a clone embryo and then manipulate it to produce an entity deserving of moral status. If so, then 
it can be maintained that the clone embryo does have the second-order capacity to develop into 
an appropriate entity to warrant attribution of moral status, just as long as we interpret “develop” 
here to include significant manipulation using advanced biotechnologies. Just as human oocyte 
and sperm may be manipulated to produce early-stage embryos via IVF, and those embryos may 
be manipulated to produce late-stage embryos and eventually neonates, it might be possible to 
manipulate clone embryos and produce entities with the relevant second-order capacities via a 
different technology. 
This response may initially appear to bring us into the realm of science fiction, as 
opposed to science fact. However, it actually does not. Currently, it is possible to conceive of 
two different ways to produce an entity with morally relevant second-order capacities using 
clone embryos. First, it is conceivable that one could derive stem cells from clone embryos and 
then manipulate those stem cells to form analogues to the cellular structures found in developing 
embryos. If such an entity were produced, then implanted, and then nurtured in just the right 
way, then it is possible that an entity with morally relevant second-order capacities could result. 
Second, it is conceivable that one could produce a clone embryo but not manipulate it to procure 
stem cells; then one could directly introduce that clone embryo into a uterus, just as would be 
done with a human embryo in IVF; finally, one could facilitate the development of the clone 
embryo until an entity with first-order morally relevant capacities results. In the following sub-
sections, I take up each of these possibilities in turn, as well as a digression discussing whether 
arguments like mine are unimportant because the issue of potentiality is not worth considering 
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(as some have argued). In the next section, I conclude by summarizing the argument in this 
chapter and considering assumptions about the nature of possibility underlying the positions I 
have considered in this chapter. 
3.3.1 Potentiality and stem cell research 
Stem cells are often described as being pluripotent, meaning that they can develop into any cell 
type, in theory.  Moreover, recent research shows that human embryonic stem cells (hESCs) can 
be engineered to produce trophoblast cells in vitro (Ezashi et al. 2012).  This further suggests that 
with the right intervention, hESCs may become totipotent, meaning they could have the potential 
to form embryonic and extraembryonic tissues, and thus be capable of producing all tissues – 
including, perhaps, a healthy, functioning, whole embryo (see Denker 2006).  Given this, one 
might wonder whether stem cells isolated from a single clone embryo could be manipulated into 
an embryonic form that could then regenerate both the trophoblast and early blastocystic 
structures, suitably organized such that a healthy, functioning, whole embryo results.  If so, this 
would suggest that isolating stem cells from a clone embryo – that is, producing clone embryonic 
stem cells (cESCs) – does not preclude using it for reproductive purposes. Because, the cESCs 
could be used to produce a “competent” clone embryo that could be implanted and would result 
in an entity deserving of moral status.   
Although the logic of this reasoning is clear, all that we know suggests this it is simply 
not possible to develop analogues to human embryonic structures in the case of clone embryos, 
as distinguished from human embryos.  Consider that embryos must develop within the zona 
pellucida, which they then hatch from before implantation.  Developing cESCs would not have 
this structure.  They would be developed in controlled laboratory conditions, without the 
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presence of materials that might, in theory, produce a clone embryo with developmental 
potential.  Moreover, even in theory, in order to engineer clone embryonic stem cells to have 
such properties would require manipulating them by introducing other cellular tissue that itself 
has some sort of developmental potential.  
This distinction is important, as it draws attention to the fact that without specific 
manipulation involving additional cellular and genomic material, hESCs have been shown to 
develop into various types of specialized cells, but not into teleologically organized entities.  
When isolated, murine stem cells naturally become cystic (Evans and Kaufman 1981), as do 
human embryonic stem cells.  Evidence also indicates that the latter become embryoid bodies, 
disorganized spherical balls containing heterogeneous tissues (Desbaillets et al. 2000), which 
may predominantly contain neuronal cells if not exposed to extrinsic influences (Smukler et al. 
2006).  Yet, how to interpret this evidence is unclear, because human embryos also form 
embryoid bodies under similar experimental conditions. So, this behavior of embryonic stem 
cells derived from human embryos may not carry moral weight if intended to distinguish 
between human embryos and hESCs.   
Nevertheless, such issues are only relevant if we first conflate human and clone embryos, 
without appreciating the differences between them described in chapter 2.  Once we recognize 
clone embryos arise from distinct origins and developmental pathways and have different 
developmental potentials, then whether one believes hESCs are capable of being used to produce 
entities that warrant moral status does not bear on whether clone embryos are so capable, 
regardless of the strength of the evidence for that belief.  Indeed, as the genetic expression 
profiles of clone embryos are significantly more similar to human embryos whose development 
has been chemically suppressed, and thus which have no developmental potential (Figure 3), we 
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should assume the same of their derivatives.  Recognizing this may make clone embryos poor 
candidates for producing (clone) embryonic stem cells or other therapeutic cell tissues, but that is 
something that is unknowable without the appropriate experimentation, and hence additional 
federal funding.22 Nevertheless, although it is conceivable that clone embryos might be used to 
produce an entity with second-order capacities that could be used for the attribution of moral 
status, the extent to which this is conceivable rests on an analogy between cESCs and hESCs that 
is untenable unless the proponent of the view finds independent reasons to challenge the claim 
that clone embryos and human embryos are not identical. 
However, we my push this argument a bit further. If we grant for the sake of argument 
that clone embryonic stem cells could be used to produce an entity with the relevant second-
order capacities, then it follows that all cells in the body would have moral status once clone 
embryos are granted moral status on the grounds considered in this section. That is, assuming 
that SCNT could be used to produce an entity deserving of moral status, we would be compelled 
to say that all of our skin cells (fibroblasts) would have the potential to produce such an entity 
via the process of SCNT; hence they would also deserve moral status (Charo 2001; cf. 
Disilvestro 2007).  This worry is exactly why distinguishing between producing and becoming is 
philosophically useful, because it aids in describing conditions where an entity does not itself 
have sufficient capacities to become a morally salient entity (or perhaps under typical 
environmental conditions that do not require significant technological intervention).  If such an 
                                                
22 One such experiment might be to repeat the experiments done by Noggle et al. (2011) to see whether 
the zygotic gene activation of hESCs was at all similar to zygotes, parthenotes, or clone embryos, and 
likewise, to compare these expression patterns to those of cESCs.  But of course, first the latter would 
have to be isolated and reliably cultured, which has only been reported once (Tachibana et al. 2013) and 
has yet to be replicated. 
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entity could be engineered to develop into a being deserving of moral status, then it is not the 
properties of that entity that are morally salient, but the properties of the technological 
interventions and those who are responsible for them that are morally salient.  
3.3.2 Potentiality de-potentialized? 
It may thus seem that proponents of the simple argument have been put in a position to jettison 
appeals to potentiality, because if the product of SCNT has the requisite sense of potentiality to 
warrant moral status, then all human skin cells warrant moral status too. If this is true, then it 
may be the case that the ethical dilemmas like those on which this thesis focuses have become 
moot or of considerably less importance, because arguments from potentiality are themselves 
impotent and thus need not be taken seriously (cf., Gottweis and Minger 2008; Holm 2008; Chan 
and Harris 2008; Watt and Kobayashi 2010).  
This argument has been given in considerable detail recently in the American Journal of 
Bioethics, where Stier and Schoene-Siefert argue that certain technologies that fall under stem 
cell research undermine the entire notion of potentiality as it applies to ethical justifications of 
stem cell research. Although their conclusion might appear consistent with the arguments given 
in this chapter, I disagree. And I believe that considering their argument further reinforces the 
view that the arguments advanced in this thesis against the prohibition of public funding for 
SCNT are worth making.  
In their paper, Stier and Schoene-Siefert purport to ‘depotentialize’ the argument from 
potentiality as it applies to stem cell research, because recent biotechnological advancements 
suggest all human cells have the potential to develop into morally significant entities.  Hence, 
under the assumptions of the potentiality argument, all cells warrant protection; and, the evident 
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absurdity of this conclusion results in a reductio. Their view rests on the contention that through 
a three-step process, cells lacking moral status may be “converted” into morally significant 
entities. Those steps are (1) “conversion” into induced pluripotent stem cells (iPSCs); (2) 
subsequent “conversion” into embryos via tetraploid complementation; and (3) introduction into 
uteruses and development into neonates (Stier and Schoene-Siefert 2013).   
Stier and Schoene-Siefert acknowledge that no human cells have ever been engineered in 
this three-step conversion process. However, recent work we have already discussed above does 
show that Steps 1 and 2 are possible using human cells (Ezashi et al. 2012). Considering these 
two “conversion steps” allows us to understand how cells are purportedly innocuously converted 
from one phase to another, concluding with their realizing putatively “latent” causal powers to 
become embryos.  
Takahashi and coauthers (2007) describe the first conversion step: human cells isolated 
by biotechnology companies from knee joints, facial skin, neonatal foreskin, or carcinomas are 
infected with specially engineered viral vectors containing high copies of codes for four proteins.  
When these proteins are produced by cells’ native machinery, they undergo changes in gene 
expression patterns, often referred to as “reprogramming.” Thereafter, the resultant cellular 
proteins cause cells to undergo morphological changes and behave like hESCs.  
Although a variety of biochemical and morphological tests show that resultant iPSCs 
behave like hESCs, much remains unknown about how Conversion Step 1 induces cells to 
undergo these changes.  As Takahashi et al. note, the mechanisms by which the four proteins 
induce pluripotency remain “elusive” (2007, p. 868). Yet, they do know that resulting cells 
exhibit more than 20 genomic retroviral integration sites, suggesting a significant increase in 
tumorigenesis in these cells and their derivatives; indeed, they report roughly 20% of mice 
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derived from iPSCs develop tumors. Moreover, for our purposes, they report important 
limitations to their research. One is that Conversion Step 1 is extremely inefficient. Each time 
they manipulated 500,000 somatic cells they were able to generate 10 iPSCs on average. Also, 
iPSCs express many genes differently than hESCs, 1,267 to be exact.  So, although the 
expression profiles of iPSCs and hESCs are much more similar to each other than either is to 
unconverted somatic cells, they clearly are not identical. 
Acknowledging these aspects of how iPSCs are produced provides one reason for 
skepticism about Stier and Schoene-Siefert’s analysis, because they claim, much like one 
customizes the options of a software program, “nothing substantial is added to the [initial] cell, 
nothing taken away” (2013).  However, our epistemic stances toward a software program differ 
considerably from a developing iPSC or human embryo. Regardless of whether one personally 
knows how software works, many do know. However, no one knows how human embryos’ 
“programs” work.  Nor do we know for sure whether the 10 iPSCs Takahashi et al. generated out 
of the initial 500,000 cells were ones they both engineered and selected for or ones they merely 
selected for. Additionally, their microarray data suggests something substantial is indeed added, 
or at east different in converted iPSCs: they contain genetic codes for proteins that change cells’ 
genetic expression profiles, which results in their having unique expression profiles from either 
their progenitor cells or hESCs. Thus, Stier and Schoene-Siefert’s claims of mere “triggering” 
overreach. 
Despite their cogent analysis of the importance of identity claims for the argument from 
potentiality, these facts threaten Stier and Schoene-Siefert’s conclusion, that in light of stem cell 
science the argument from potentiality is impotent. We simply do not know what it would mean 
to be identical to an iPSC, because we do not know enough about how iPSCs are created. 
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Assuming a reductionistic line of reasoning and solely using a measure of genetic similarity, it 
appears iPSCs are a unique type of cell, being neither identical to their precursors nor hESCs.  
Hence, I agree with Stier and Schoene-Siefert’s claim, that to understand the moral status of 
iPSCs, we will have to make claims about the morality of their production, rather than about 
their identity relations.  However, I disagree that these cells are derived by innocuous means, and 
thus that “convertibility” is an acceptable premise in a reductio against the argument from 
potentiality. 
This point relates to a second reason for skepticism about the convertibility of iPSCs. In 
Conversion Step 2, it is important to focus on the method of tetraploid complementation. 
Therein, two two-celled embryos are suspended between electrodes and electrically pulsed, 
causing them to join, which results in the four-celled “tetraploid.”  After a day of culturing, 10-
15 ESCs or iPSCs may be placed between two tetraploids in a well on a culture plate.  In mice, 
after another day of culturing, the resulting “aggregates” may be transferred to pseudo-pregnant 
females, who will later bear live pups at extremely low rates of efficiency (Nagy et al. 1993; 
Kang et al. 2009). This experimental procedure justifies the claim that any cell has the potential 
to be “converted” into a morally significant entity. 
Briefly describing Conversion Step 2 suffices for motivating skepticism about its 
innocuousness because it shows that to convert iPSCs to embryos requires one first begins with 
embryos. One must destroy two embryos in order to generate one embryo from iPSCs. It is not as 
though innocuous cells are manipulated in morally irrelevant ways in order to produce embryos 
by “cell conversion.”  No, one destroys two embryos in the process.  Thus the moral algebra 
seems quite clear.  One begins with two entities that have potential in any meaningful sense of 
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the term.  Then one manipulates those entities in ways that purportedly destroys that potential 
and uses them to generate potential in a group of cells that, prior to that moment, lacked it.  
Much remains unknown about early embryogenesis, and hence the development of 
embryo-like cells, including clone embryos, iPSCs, and hESCs. And, our ignorance is important 
because it must be acknowledged when evaluating the cogency of arguments like Stier and 
Schoene-Siefert’s.  We know that embryos under natural conditions reliably lead to fetuses and 
neonates.  We know that iPSCs do not.  We know that unless they are experimentally 
manipulated to form denuded tetraploids, human embryos are the paradigmatic cells by which 
the notion of potentiality gains its meaning.  But, we do not know how they do it.  We do not 
know what confers this potential. Thus, although I agree with Stier and Schoene-Siefert’s 
ultimate aim of countering arguments from potentiality, I believe their argument overreaches, 
further muddying debates over the ethics of hESC-related research. 
Thus, I concede that the argument from potentiality is useful. I believe that if an entity 
has the potential to develop into an entity with the first-order capacity to exhibit morally relevant 
properties, then this provides a compelling reason to attribute moral status to it. I am not sure this 
provides a sufficient reason, but I believe that arguing in this fashion, by appeal to potentiality, is 
a useful exercise for exploring our agreements and disagreements about which entities deserve 
moral status. It reveals, for example, that one can endorse the view that human embryos have 
moral status because of second-order characteristics, and yet one can also consistently reject the 
view that clone embryos do. 
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3.3.3 Potentiality and reproductive cloning 
Acknowledging the usefulness of the potentiality argument does not entail that clone embryos 
deserve moral status. Indeed, I have given reasons to think that under traditional accounts of 
moral status, they should not. However, I believe one route remains open to the proponents of 
prohibiting using public funds for nonreproductive cloning, although it is one that can be 
dispensed with rather quickly. A reasonable response to my claims might be to ask whether, if 
they were not used for research and were enabled, clone embryos could develop into an entity of 
moral significance such as a later stage embryo, a fetus, or a neonate. To make this claim is to 
introduce a variant of Premise 2 of the simple argument and reasons that support it. That is, it is 
to claim that clone embryos warrant moral respect precisely because of their ability to produce 
certain entities if suitably manipulated and introduced into an intrauterine environment. If it were 
possible to use clone embryos to produce an entity that has morally relevant first order 
capacities, then that would imply that there is a route from the SCNT technique to an entity that 
warrants moral status. If this were the case, then the claim that clone embryos have the second-
order capacity to produce an entity with morally relevant first-order capacities under certain 
conditions would be true. Thus, nonreproductive cloning would be morally wrong because it 
would prevent an entity that has sufficient second-order capacities to develop morally relevant 
first-order capacities to warrant moral status. What makes nonreproductive cloning morally 
wrong on this view is thus the capacity of the clone embryo under certain circumstances, not the 
extent to which clone embryos are or are not identical to human embryos. 
Before considering the plausibility of these claims, it should first be made clear that they 
constitute an important shift in the discussion: we are now considering whether performing 
SCNT for reproductive purposes might create an entity of moral worth, and therefore, whether 
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the potential of creating such an entity would delegitimize cloning for the purposes of 
researching cell therapies.  We are not focusing on the simple argument that has been central to 
policy discussions regarding publicly funding nonreproductive cloning research, as I 
demonstrated in chapter 1, which merely held that human embryos and clone embryos are 
identical. Instead, we are discussing a different argument, that clone embryos warrant moral 
respect because of their capacity to become certain sorts of entities under certain experimental 
circumstances.23 Again, even if this were the case, it must be recognized that the proposal 
defended here – that SCNT is a tool for producing immunocompatible stem cells that should be 
federally funded – is independent from the proposal that we should fund research into SCNT for 
reproductive purposes.  Nevertheless, this line of argument must be taken seriously. 
There is absolutely no evidence that reproductive cloning is possible in human beings.  
This may of course be because experiments designed to show it is possible are almost universally 
forbidden, and thus would not be reported.  Nevertheless, proof of concept experiments in other 
species are telling.  Reproductive cloning – the production of live offspring via SCNT combined 
with other artificial reproductive technologies – has been successfully attempted in six 
mammalian species.  Yet despite considerable attempts by teams who have cloned other species, 
it has never been achieved in primates (De Sousa et al. 2004; Lee et al. 2005; Sparman, 
Tachibana, and Mitalipov 2010).  Across mammalian species, the success rate of reproductive 
                                                
23 Note that this argument is also cited in policy discussions of the permissibility of publicly funding 
nonreproductive cloning. For example, Leon Kass makes this point during the deliberations of the PCBE 
over the issue of funding SCNT (see § 4.3 below). However, as this is not the argument that has been 
given to justify the current policy prohibiting federal funding of SCNT, it is not the direct target of my 
analysis. But as it an argument the proponent of prohibition may be expected to give, it is one must 
preoccupy us at moments in this discussion.  
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cloning is 1-4%, and once born, “despite apparent physical well-being,” these offspring “still 
have genetic or epigenetic abnormalities” (De Sousa 2004, p. 353).  Early embryonic 
development varies widely across species, including fundamental differences between humans 
and all of the mammals cloned thus far (cf. Stern 2004), and these differences are hypothesized 
to explain why human clone embryos develop poorly when compared with human embryos (as 
shown in Figure 3).  
Lacking evidence that reproductive cloning is possible in human beings, one might 
nevertheless appeal to the fact that it has occurred in mammals to argue by analogy that it is 
possible in humans.  It must be admitted that this response simply cannot be decisively defeated: 
it is true that reproductive cloning has successfully been performed in mammals.  But there are 
good reasons to think that this argument from analogy is unpersuasive.  Consider that our best 
estimates suggest in healthy women natural conception has about a 68% success rate for 
producing a live offspring (Wilcox et al. 1999).  Once a woman has conceived, the chance that 
zygote will develop and she will bring it to term are quite good.  Even if a woman conceives 
using artificial reproductive technologies, the chance she will bring a child to term are quite 
good.  In 2009, the last year for which there is data, 41% of IVF cycles resulted in a live birth 
(CDC 2011).  These statistics suggest that even if, for the sake of argument, we suppose that 
cloning was possible in human beings, and that the rate of success was similar to that seen in 
other mammals, it would still remain unclear that such successes are good evidence for the claim 
that clone embryos could be used to produce entities with morally relevant first-order capacities.   
Thus, evidence suggests that enabled human embryos have a good chance of developing 
into neonates.  By contrast, even granting a number of contentious assumptions and absent any 
evidence, it seems that, in theory, enabled clone embryos would have an extremely poor chance 
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of developing into neonates. Indeed, without granting those assumptions, they should be said to 
have no chance at all. Therefore, I conclude that this approach to grounding the attribution of 
moral status upon the clone embryo’s capacity to produce an entity with second-order morally 
relevant capacities is unsatisfying, just as the previous attempts considered above are. 
3.4 How Simple is the Argument? 
In this chapter, I have considered how a proponent of the simple argument might respond to my 
claims by appealing to the notion of moral status. I have argued that traditional accounts of moral 
status are not up to the task, because clone embryos are not of human origins in the way required 
by the anthropocentric approach and they do not have the capacity to exhibit first-order moral 
properties as is required on characteristics approaches. Yet, I recognized that another route was 
open to those who are swayed by the simple argument: they could argue that if an entity has a 
second-order capacity to develop such that they will at some later time exhibit a first-order 
capacity, then this warrants the attribution of moral status. And I have argued against this view 
by providing reasons against accepting the two ways it might be unpacked, in terms of a clone 
embryo having the capacity to be used to make a morally relevant entity via manipulation and 
combination with human embryonic stem cells or via reproductive cloning. 
 By drawing out the implications of the retreat to moral status in this way, I believe what 
has become clear is that the simple argument may not be so simple after all. It may rest on an 
extremely contentious assumption of how to attribute moral status, which I identified in the 
beginning of section 3.2. I have shown that in the case of clone embryos, however, even on this 
contentious account of moral status attribution, clone embryos do not deserve moral status. Yet 
in one sense, my conclusion is limited because it rests on empirical claims about the 
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developmental potentials of clone embryos, and these claims may of course be overturned or 
become problematic in the future. The proponent of prohibiting public funding for SCNT may 
think that this is at last a moment of victory. And so it is, in a way. I cannot conclusively refute 
the claim that it is conceivable, it is possible, that clone embryos could develop into a being that 
warrants attribution of moral status.  
 Yet I believe that appealing to this concession to support prohibiting using public funds 
for nonreproductive cloning would be a significant mistake by my interlocutor, because it would 
reveal a troubling assumption about the sense of conceivability or possibility that is sufficient for 
making moral judgments. On this view, clone embryos produced for reproductive purposes may 
be said to be capable of developing into an entity with moral status, such as a neonate or 17-
week embryo. But notice that the sense of possibility is of the weakest possible sense, which we 
might call logical possibility.  That is, hypothetically, and granting many contentious and 
evidentially unsupported assumptions, it is logically possible that clone embryos might be 
capable of producing human offspring. And even then, they could do so only if enabled, and in 
violation of strong social and legal prohibitions against such activities.  
We may distinguish among logical and nomological possibility,24 where the latter is 
actual possibility, grounded in empirical observation or perhaps by reference to scientific laws if 
such laws were available.  No evidence exists to support the claim that it is nomologically 
possible for enabled clone embryos to develop into neonates, or any other stage of development 
past the blastocyst.  Thus, as this is necessary for establishing the claim that clone embryos have 
                                                
24 See Singer and Dawson (1988) for an expression of this distinction and application of it to embryo 
experimentation. 
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a second-order capacity such that they deserve moral status, the claim that they do have such a 
capacity is unsupported by the available evidence.   
Given that my thesis is that the simple argument fails as a justification of prohibiting 
funding for non-reproductive cloning, the remote logical possibility that a clone embryo could, in 
theory, develop into a neonate is a pyrrhic victory for the proponent of prohibition.25  It 
underscores how different human embryos and clone embryos are, and hence, that the moral 
status of the former hangs on different assumptions than the latter. Clone embryos and human 
embryos are ontologically distinct, and this distinction carries moral weight.  Even if one holds 
that human embryos have a moral status that precludes federally funding research upon them, 
accepting this position does not entail the same view of clone embryos.  To defend a prohibition 
of federal funding for SCNT for research purposes requires additional assumptions, ones that 
should be doubted in light of the argument given here. 
 
 
                                                
25 Stated thusly, this argument suggests the questions, what threshold for potentiality (possibility) is 
sufficient to warrant moral status or protection; and likewise, how should we respond to the fact that there 
is some, albeit only logical, possibility that a clone embryo could develop into a neonate?  By 
distinguishing between logical and nomological possibility, we can appreciate just how low, yet 
uncertain, these possibilities are, which is an important advance in our accounts of what justifies science-
funding policies.  Nevertheless, even this minimal possibility suggests that the correct stance regarding 
funding is one that is cautious, such as using strict, adaptive funding policies that respond to science 
quickly as we learn more about the entities under discussion (see Mitchell 2009). 
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4.0  POLITICAL REALITIES AND POLICYMAKING 
Having considered the high-road retreat to moral status and found it indefensible, it is important 
to consider a lower route to justifying the ban on federally funding cloning for biomedical 
research instead, namely via an appeal to the bearing of political realities on policymaking.  On 
such an account, what justifies the ban would not be the claim that SCNT produces human 
embryos, nor would it be that clone embryos have moral status.  Rather it would be justified by 
claims about the political nature of making science policy, which, when added to the simple 
argument, make it sound.  Three such attempts are considered in this chapter. First, I consider 
whether simply explaining the current ban on federal funding for SCNT would suffice to justify 
it, which I dismiss as an inappropriate distortion of the notion “justification” (§ 4.1). In section 
4.2, I consider whether it is possible to justify the current ban based on the claim that it is 
necessary to simplify scientific claims during policymaking, which requires policies that may not 
be consistent with the sorts of scientific evidence I have marshaled above. I argue that this has 
the unsatisfying implication that we should encourage our policymakers to make policy based on 
falsehoods, and thus, is unacceptable. In the last section, I consider whether a procedural 
approach to justification might suffice for justifying the policies that result from it, including 
those that currently prohibit public funding for SCNT. I find this line of argument promising but 
I argue that the detailed analysis required to develop this line of argument prevents me from 
 58 
exploring it here. Whether a procedural account of policy justification would support the 
proponent of prohibition, I conclude, is an empirical question. 
4.1 To Explain the Ban is to Justify the Ban 
One might say that what justifies policy is not a logically sound argument, but political will and 
capital.  Thus, to explain the ban on cloning requires an analysis of the political forces leading to 
the passage of the Dickey-Wicker Amendment and subsequent political events.  The ban on 
cloning would be explicable by reference to historical political events, which would justify the 
ban by explicating the means by which it occurred.  On this account, the Rawlsian standard of 
reasonableness bears little weight. The ban is justified by the sheer fact that it happened via some 
confluence of political events, irrespective of whether these events hold up to philosophical 
scrutiny. 
The force of this alternative approach to justifying the existing ban on cloning rests on 
one’s intuitions about philosophy and criticism in policy formation.  One might believe that no 
amount of deliberation can alter the entrenched moral foundations of individuals’ dispositions to 
support one or another policy.  Under this purview, the analytic work performed here is solely 
(and presumably pejoratively) academic.  Analyzing the logic underlying policy is not only 
quixotic, but also beside the point, because what justifies new political actions like creating and 
enacting policy are prior political acts. 
Although a lesson worth learning is expressed by this response – that philosophical 
argument alone is insufficient to evaluate policy change – as an objection to the argument given 
here, the response fails because it overreaches in redefining justification.  To justify something is 
to show that it is right or reasonable in accordance with some accepted standard or norm, rather 
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than simply to show how it happened.  To treat justifying the prohibition synonymously with 
explaining its political history is to replace the standards of justification with those of 
description.  This is unacceptable because of its significant consequences.  On such an account, 
how would political decisions be open to criticism?  How could one ever question the credibility 
of governmental policy?  One could not.  Rather, faced with incredible policies, one would be 
reduced to accepting them as the product of some explicable political process, and hence 
justified.  This will not do.  Policymaking should be accountable to standards over and above 
political expediency.  Justification by appeal to commonly accepted norms is one of these, and 
on the account of justification as reasonableness, the ban on funding SCNT remains unjustified.   
 
4.2 Simplification and Falsehoods in Policymaking 
Recognizing the political realities of policymaking may justify the ban on funding 
nonreproductive cloning in another way: one might reply to my argument by claiming that 
appealing to a simple fact about policymaking rehabilitates the simple argument.  That is, one 
could say the consideration of numerous scientific details, as is done above, is inimical to the 
activity of policymaking.  Rather, since making policy requires agreement between individuals 
of varying intellectual backgrounds and political loyalties, policymakers must simplify scientific 
information when creating policy.  Moreover, in some cases, such simplification entails that the 
depiction of scientific information used for forming policy will prove false if compared with a 
richer depiction from unsimplified scientific information.   
What justifies the ban under this account is not the simple argument per se, but the simple 
argument with the additional premise that simplification is necessary in policymaking, even to 
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the point of falsehood. The current ban is then justified not despite its reliance on an identity 
claim between clone embryos and human embryos, but because of it: because a simplified and 
false representation of science is necessary for policymaking in today’s political climate, 
arguments based on it are justified. 
This is an interesting response to the arguments given here, and simply articulating it is to 
advance our understanding of the logic of science policy formation and the role that philosophy 
can play in that process.  Notably, the response has gained some support from well-respected 
bioethicists involved in policymaking activities.  For example, while discussing his time with the 
President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and 
Behavioral Research, Alan Weisbard writes that even when philosophical analyses of policy 
options were given during deliberations, they were not helpful.  Rather, at the level of macro-
policy, “philosophical analysis tended to invoke standards for justification that few real world 
policy initiatives (including those likely to command widespread political support in a ‘mixed’ 
society like our own) could meet” (1987, p. 781).  Dan Brock agrees that there is a deep tension 
between academic philosophy and policymaking, which he believes arises out of the 
philosopher’s commitment to truth on the one hand and the policymaker’s commitment to 
enacting policy on the other.  By his lights, the virtues of philosophy simply do not translate well 
to policymaking (Brock 1987, pp. 786-787; cf. Wickler 1991). 
If the political realities of policymaking are inimical to philosophical criticism, and 
hence, to fruitful contributions by scholars whose policy work is consistent with the professional 
standards of philosophy, I believe it is a problem for policymaking, not for philosophy.  Thus, 
though we may recognize that the political realities of policymaking may likely require a 
participant to alter his or her standards in order to effectively contribute to the process, 
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acknowledging this need not equate to a call for lowering those standards, which is, in effect, 
what the justification of the simplification of scientific information comes down to.  That tactic 
would entail that we not only accept, but also in fact encourage, our leaders and policymakers to 
make policy decisions on the basis of far less knowledge than is available.  This would amount to 
encouraging policymaking from ignorance, a perverse endeavor for the philosopher committed to 
characterizing and articulating justified knowledge.  While we must accept that our leaders and 
policymakers are at times ignorant of the subtleties of the science their regulations target, 
philosophers should not enshrine this ignorance by using its inevitability as a premise for the 
justification of policies based on falsehoods.  
4.3 Proceduralism and Policymaking 
A proponent of the simple argument may respond to my claims about policymaking by pointing 
to a procedural account of policy justification. Policies and regulations, it could be claim, are 
justified just so long as they are produced via a certain sort of procedure. In the case of stem cell 
research, Benjamin Capps has argued exactly this. According to him, the argument for 
authoritative regulation of stem cell research is as follows. First, if we recognize both that our 
society is a pluralistic democratic society and that reasonable persons will disagree on the 
permissibility of possible courses of action in controversial cases like stem cell research, then it 
follows that significant disputes will arise for us. Now, Capps suggests that it might be possible 
that in such cases the views are not so extreme as to preclude peaceful orderly co-existence. 
However, he suggests that in the case of stem cell research the rhetoric of the two sides to the 
debate is so strong that this is not such a case. One side believes that scientific research harms 
human embryos, whereas the other side believes that not performing research harms suffering 
 62 
human beings with debilitating diseases. Hence, Capps concludes that some action is required to 
resolve the reasonable disagreement about the public good. He proposes that a Rawlsian 
procedural approach to justification is particularly well suited to such a circumstance because it 
emphasizes thorough, unbiased deliberation and the protection of those who might be harmed by 
permitting actions or prohibiting them (Capps 2008). 
I have a strong affinity for Capps’ approach. I have cited Rawls’ account of 
reasonableness above, and I believe that a Rawlsian account of ethical justification is preferable 
to other accounts because of its anti-essentialism and anti-foundationalism (see Walden 2013). 
However I do not believe that such an approach will be useful to those who would prohibit 
funding because of the type of justification that would have to be given for the prohibition. 
Capps says that a procedure that would justify authoritative regulation in stem cell research and 
cases like it would include a number of procedural stages. These would include an “egalitarian 
election process” by which policies are evaluated by the public, and mechanisms for “reactive 
policies,” whereby existing policies may be modified in light of unanticipated developments (for 
instance, in scientific knowledge), which would be determined in a fair way by the sitting 
government. In addition, procedures would require that government policy is enacted according 
to fair deliberation among policymakers, which Capps characterizes as follows: 
In the political setting, optimum procedures allow free discussion, critical debate, and 
(peaceful) dissent. If these procedures are consented to – which is assumed on an 
individual level by simply participating in the process – they are committed (up to a 
point) to supporting its binding outcomes. Coherent policies cannot be reasonably 
rejected if they are soundly built upon procedures that: (1) acknowledge reasonable 
disagreement on the matter; (2) incorporate important elements of any personal moral 
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position; and (3) respect as many different reasonable positions as any workable 
alternative. (Capps 2008, p. 49) 
Capps’ description of a procedural approach to justifying federal funding policies for 
stem cell research describes a much higher bar for justification than were considered in the 
previous two sections of this chapter. And this is a bar that I am skeptical the proponent of the 
ban will be able to meet. To justify the prohibition by appeal to such a procedural account will 
require showing that policies were enacted through an egalitarian electoral process. Certainly, no 
elections have been held on the matter of stem cell research policies in particular in the United 
States. However, elected officials have played roles in deliberating stem cell research policies, as 
I discussed in chapter 1. Granting for the sake of argument that these processes meet the 
threshold Capps describes, I believe it is an open question whether existing policies have been 
modified in light of developments in our scientific understanding of the ontological differences 
between human and clone embryos. The bulk of my argument suggests they have not, and I 
believe they should be. 
However, I cannot conclude that policies have not been adequately updated in light of the 
knowledge I have discussed in this thesis. Yet, neither can the proponent of prohibition conclude 
that policies have been so updated. Because, to do this would require showing that the sorts of 
deliberation that undergird our current policies were “soundly built” on the procedures quoted 
above: recognition of reasonable disagreement, incorporation of personal moral positions, and 
respect of as many different reasonable positions as possible. Such an analysis would require 
identifying how information about different moral positions becomes recognized at the level of 
policymaking and then becomes considered by actual policymakers during the instantiation of 
the ideal procedure described by Capps. Considering such procedures would result in a lengthy 
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analysis that cannot be taken up here. It would require, for example, considering the many 
instances of disagreement, persuasion, acceptance, agreement, endorsement, and other such 
attitudes and activities during the deliberations between policymakers, such as the members of 
the PCBE. If so, it then becomes an empirical question whether the policy of prohibition could 
be justified on procedural grounds.  
Again, this is not an empirical question that can be answered in this analysis, because it 
simply lies beyond the scope of our discussion. However, I close this chapter by offering the 
following passage by members of the PCBE, as they deliberate about the appropriate 
terminology to use when referring to the product of SCNT. Many such passages can be found in 
their deliberations, and this one was chosen merely for convenience and because it was relatively 
short, compared to the convolutedness of ordinary speech found in the PCBE member’s open 
discussions. I believe this passage shows that the deliberation did consider the recognition of 
reasonable disagreement, but I also believe it shows a reluctance to incorporate the personal 
moral positions of some deliberators on the council. Thus, I believe it remains an open question 
whether a procedural approach might rescue the current prohibition on public funding for SCNT. 
Yet, it is clear to me that given the discussion above, this is the only justification that remains 
available for that view. 
DR. GAZZANIGA: In the spirit of reducing linguistic sloppiness, speech as fact, 
if you look at the two definitions there, which basically are what are at stake here 
in terms of us trying to determine what we mean by those, the reproductive 
cloning, as stated there, is creating a living cloned human embryo. We stopped 
there because that is how each definition is launched. I think the case could be 
made that using the word "creating" is loaded; "living" is redundant; and 
"embryo" is flat out wrong. […] 
 
CHAIRMAN KASS: Now, why isn't a cell, which is -- will on its own proceed 
to divide and develop to the blastocyst stage -- I think there is a certain place 
earlier in the discussion where it describes this product. It is a cell but it is not an 
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ordinary cell. It is a cell that resembles and can be made to act like a fertilized 
egg. It not only has the full complement of chromosomes but, unlike a 
somatic cell, it is capable of developing into a new organism. In other words, 
it is a zygote or a zygote-like being. Is that – 
 
DR. GAZZANIGA: It is not a zygote. 
 
CHAIRMAN KASS: It is a zygote or a zygote-like being. Do you think that is 
wrong? 
 
DR. GAZZANIGA: Well, it is a totipotent cell that is being reprogrammed is 
what it is. A zygote means two gametes have come together to form. […] 
 
PROF. DRESSER: This is somewhat related. On page 5, the first two paragraphs 
or second two paragraphs, there is a lot of discussion about this as a cell that 
could become, I mean, implicitly a baby and, I guess, this is somewhat related. It 
struck me that we do not really know that. I mean, it is -- we do not know 
whether it is a potential human life. […] 
 
DR. GAZZANIGA: I do not see the problem. Synthesizing a totipotent cell for 
the purposes of developing a blastocyst is an accurate description of what is going 
on. 
 
CHAIRMAN KASS: Yes, but look -- 
 
DR. GAZZANIGA: And it is not an embryo in the sense of how embryo is 
defined in the medical and scientific literature. […] 
 
CHAIRMAN KASS: And I think that whether -- that the -- the textbook 
biological definition of embryo as from fertilization to -- I have forgotten, is it 
two months or eight weeks when they start calling it a fetus? There is something 
arbitrary about that and it seems to me that what you mean humanly speaking 
when you are synthesizing this is do you or do you not have that which can turn 
into an adult? Does it have the potency if it works? Now Rebecca's point is still 
here but, if it works, is not the product of somatic cell nuclear transfer identical 
to the product of fertilization in this respect, mainly both of them, if things go 
well are capable of producing an adult of that species? And, therefore, to call one 
a totipotent cell and to call the other one an embryo or a zygote might be 
technically correct but it would be to substitute a certain technical meaning 
for the human import. The human import is if they are totipotent they are 
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both the same. 
 
DR. GAZZANIGA: Well, I hear you but creating a living cloned human 
embryo is loaded connotatively and everything else, and to say synthesizing a 
totipotent cell is the accurate way of describing it -- now the interpretations and 
ethics of that event are all subsequent to getting the initial definition correct 
(PCBE 2002b; italics and bold added for emphasis and the sake of clarity). 
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5.0  CONCLUSION 
This thesis argues that when performed for research purposes somatic cell nuclear transfer does 
not require the destruction of human embryos; it requires the creation and destruction of clone 
embryos to produce cell lines.  Therefore, it claims that the longstanding bipartisan ban 
prohibiting federal funding of SCNT is unjustified because it rests on an unsound argument that 
assumes SCNT does destroy human embryos.  Two types of responses to this position have been 
anticipated. First, that it fails because it sidesteps the ethical question of whether clone embryos 
deserve moral status, and second, that it fails because alternative sources of justifying the ban 
may be given by appealing to the political realities of policymaking. It is hoped that the 
argument given here will persuade others that federal science policy is a topic worthy of 
philosophical analysis, and exposing the reasoning that grounds our policies is a useful 
application of philosophical criticism.  More attention to the particular topic of somatic cell 
nuclear transfer may reveal additional reasons to doubt the conclusions argued for here; however, 
the effort of analyzing science policy is one that I believe will continue to have substantial 
payoffs for both the scholar and the broader community, which must pay the costs for regulations 
of the means for pursuing the quintessentially humane end of relieving suffering.  
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